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Thisarticledescribesa2-systemsmodelthatexplainssocialbehaviorasajointfunc-
tionofreflectiveandimpulsiveprocesses.Inparticular,itisassumedthatsocialbehav-
ioriscontrolledby2interactingsystemsthatfollowdifferentoperatingprinciples.The
reflective system generates behavioral decisions that are based on knowledge about
facts and values, whereas the impulsive system elicits behavior through associative
links and motivational orientations. The proposed model describes how the 2 systems
interactatvariousstagesofprocessing,andhowtheiroutputsmaydeterminebehavior
inasynergisticorantagonisticfashion.Itextendspreviousmodelsbyintegratingmoti-
vationalcomponentsthatallowmoreprecisepredictionsofbehavior.Theimplications
of this reflective–impulsive model are applied to various phenomena from social psy-
chologyandbeyond.Extendingpreviousdual-processaccounts,thismodelisnotlim-
itedtospecificdomainsofmentalfunctioningandattemptstointegratecognitive,moti-
vational, and behavioral mechanisms.
In the history of attempts to discover the causes of
humanbehavior,themostwidespreadexplanationsare
based on the assumption that human beings do what
they believe is good for them. Thus, they are construed
as “rational animals” capable of recognizing the value
or utility of their actions.
At the same time, however, it is obvious that human
beings do not always act this way; that is, under certain
circumstancespeoplebehaveinwaysthatdonotreflect
theirvalues.Toaccountforthisphenomenon,towhich
the Greek philosophers gave the name akrasia (e.g.,
Mele, 1992), several strategies have been pursued. The
first strategy assumes ignorance or lack of knowledge
on the part of the actor. Socrates, for example, claimed
that if people only knew what is good for them, they
would act accordingly. A similar position is held by
moderneconomistswhoimplythatirrationaldecisions
reflect a lack of appropriate information (Friedman,
1976).Thesecondstrategypostulatesmorethanoneset
ofprinciplesthatmaycontrolhumanaction.Forexam-
ple,abehaviormayoccurmindlessly(Langer,Blank,&
Chanowitz, 1978) or automatically; that is, without di-
rectingmuchattentiontotheutilityofanoutcome,aper-
sonmayactthewayheorshehasactedmanytimesbe-
fore. Such habitual behaviors were the focus of many
psychological theories in which the frequency and re-
cency of previous executions of a given behavior were
seen as primary determinants (e.g., Hull, 1943). The
thirdstrategyhasbeentounderstandhumanbehavioras
afunctionofdrives.Inparticular,basicneedsthatarebi-
ologically rooted, such as hunger, thirst, or reproduc-
tion,areseenasmajorforces.Theirstrengthmayover-
rideconsiderationsofutilityanddeterminebehaviorin
an immediate fashion.
Althoughmostpsychologicaltheorieshavefocused
on one of these aspects, some have acknowledged that
behaviors may be multiply determined. Most promi-
nently,Freud(e.g.,1933/1949)describedhumanbehav-
iorascontrolledbya“psychicapparatus”thatincludes
several operating principles: a superego composed of a
person’svaluesandnorms,anidthatoperatesinaccor-
dance with the basic drives a person is endowed with,
andanegothatintegratesandoftenreconcilestheforces
fromthesuperegoandtheid.Thus,Freudiantheoryalso
describes how different processes may interact. In par-
ticular, Freud deserves credit for emphasizing the im-
portanceofunconsciousprocessesinthedetermination
ofbehavior.AlthoughFreud’sthinkinghasgreatlystim-
ulated psychological theorizing, evidence for the pro-
posed mechanisms was largely anecdotal or based on
Personality and Social Psychology Review
2004, Vol. 8, No. 3, 220–247
Copyright © 2004 by
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
220
Thisarticlereceivedthe2003TheoreticalInnovationPriceofthe
SocietyforPersonalityandSocialPsychology(SPSP).Thisresearch
wassupportedbygrantsfromtheDeutscheForschungsgemeinschaft
(DFG) to Fritz Strack (Str 264/19–1) and from the
Deutsch-IsraelischeProjektkooperation(DIP).Theauthorsaregrate-
fultothemembersoftheWürzburgSocialCognitionGroupwhopro-
videdvaluablesuggestions.SpecialthanksgotoDoloresAlbarracin,
Axel Bühler, Bertram Gawronski, Arie Kruglanski, Ravit Levy,
ThomasMussweiler,EliotSmith,BobWyer,andfiveanonymousre-
viewersfortheirdetailedcommentsandcriticisms.Also,wethankthe
participants of our seminar on the topic, held in summer and winter
2001 at the University of Würzburg. The project has greatly profited
fromthelivelydiscussionsandthevaluableinputfromourstudents.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Fritz Strack or Roland
Deutsch, Lehrstuhl für Psychologie II, Universität Würzburg,
Röntgenring 10, 97070 Würzburg, Germany. E-mail: strack@
psychologie.uni-wuerzburg.de or deutsch@
psychologie.uni-wuerzburg.declinical case studies; that is, little evidence has been
available to evaluate the postulated processes.
More recently, the conviction that human behavior
is guided by more than one underlying process has led
to a series of research programs that have resulted in a
number of dual-process theories. This converging evi-
dence has been extensively discussed by many authors
whocontributedtoarecentbookondual-processtheo-
ries in social psychology edited by Chaiken and Trope
(1999; for more complex theories of mental processes,
see,e.g.,Kuhl&Goschke,1994).Ofcourse,thesethe-
ories are not entirely unique but share a considerable
number of features. In a systematic comparison, Smith
and DeCoster (2000) juxtaposed the nine most promi-
nent models and identified their common and distinc-
tive characteristics.
Most important, all models propose two modes of
information processing that are distinguished, accord-
ing to Smith and DeCoster (2000, p. 111, Table 1), by
the following characteristics: rule-based processing
“Draws on symbolically represented rules…That are
structured by language and logic…And can be learned
in just one or a few experiences…Occurs optionally
when capacity and motivation are present…And often
with conscious awareness of steps of processing;” in
contrast, associative processing “Draws on associa-
tions…That are structured by similarity and contigu-
ity…And are learned over many experiences…Occurs
automatically…And preconsciously, with awareness
of the result of processing.”
Whereas these characteristics are shared by the ma-
jor two-process models, Smith and DeCoster (2000)
saw the most substantive difference in whether the two
typesofprocessesoccursimultaneouslyorinamutually
exclusive fashion. In addition, the existing models are
distinct in that they focus on different phenomena and
employ different terminology to describe various as-
pects of the two types of processing. For example,
Chaiken, Liberman, and Eagly (1989) as well as Petty
andCacioppo(1986),whoareamongtheproponentsof
dual-process models, spoke about heuristic/peripheral
and systematic/central processing and applied their
modeltothedomainofattitudechange.Inthespontane-
ous mode of Fazio’s (1986) model of attitude access,
well-learned attitudes are assumed to be automatically
activated by attitude objects. Only if sufficient motiva-
tion and opportunity are present, will deliberative pro-
cessing determine the evaluation of an object. Devine
(1989) focused on stereotyping and assumed either au-
tomaticprocessesormoreeffortfulstereotypesuppres-
sion. Gilbert (1989) distinguished between correspon-
dent inferences and attributional thinking to explain
phenomenaofpersonperceptionandbiasesincausalat-
tribution. Martin, Seta, and Crelia (1990) were inter-
ested in social judgments and juxtaposed automatic
contextual influences and more strategic and effortful
attempts at correcting them. Epstein (1991) differenti-
atedbetweenexperientialandrationalprocessesandap-
plied his theory to general mechanisms of thinking.
Finally, Sloman (1996), whose model serves as a con-
ceptual orientation for other dual-process approaches,
invokedassociativeandrule-basedprocessestoaccount
for human reasoning.
Over the years, dual-process models have been re-
finedandupdatedinvariousways.Forexample,Smith
andDeCoster(2000)haveintegratednewfindingsfrom
research on memory systems (J. L. McClelland,
McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995) to explain how asso-
ciativeandrule-basedprocessingmayberootedinmore
basic cognitive structures. Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert,
and Trope (2002) described a cybernetically oriented
two-processmodelwhileintegratingfindingsfromneu-
roscience.Thusfar,however,dual-processmodelshave
directed little attention to the behavioral consequences
ofthementalmechanismstheydescribe,andtheydonot
provide an alternative to rational models of human be-
havior. In particular, they are silent on the problem of
akrasia. Although there are some accounts that focus
primarily on behavior (Bargh, 1990), they do not pro-
videanintegrationintoacomprehensivemodelofsocial
cognition. This, precisely, is the aim of this article,
which attempts to incorporate insights from motiva-
tional science (Higgins & Kruglanski, 2000) into the
general dual-process idea.
Although Smith and DeCoster’s (2000) survey is
certainly not complete (cf. Wilson, Lindsey, & School-
er, 2000), it is obvious that the processes described in
these models focus on judgments and information pro-
cessing, whereas behavior does not play an integral
role. In other words, behavior is implied in these mod-
els primarily to the extent that it is preceded by a judg-
ment or a decision. However, behavior is known to oc-
cur without such antecedents. For example,
judgment-based behaviors may become habitualized
through frequent execution and be carried out inde-
pendent of the implications of the original judgment
(Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Ouelette & Wood, 1998).
In addition, strong motivational forces may drive a be-
havior in a direction that is inconsistent with an actor’s
beliefs and values (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Strack
& Neumann, 1996). However, such direct influences
on behavior have links to mechanisms described in the
models summarized by Smith and DeCoster (2000).
Therefore, it seemed necessary to integrate behavioral,
motivational, and cognitive components into a
two-system model of social behavior.
Along with others (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002),
we assume that the processes operate in parallel in-
steadofbeingconsecutivelyinvoked,andwepositthat
the two systems are concurrently active and compete
for control of an overt response. Thus, in contrast to
most of the dual-process models previously described,
the proposed model is a two-systems model (see also,
Gilovich & Griffin, 2002) of social behavior.
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generationofsocialjudgments,weattempttointegrate
elements from other research programs that provide
links to social behavior. Specifically, the work by Nor-
man and Shallice (1986), Cacioppo, Priester, and
Berntson,(1993),aswellasGollwitzer(1999)provided
important conceptual elements that added a motiva-
tionaldimensiontothemodel.Inparticular,wesuggest
that behavior is a function of schemata that are jointly
controlledbyenvironmentalinputandsuperordinateat-
tention(Norman&Shallice,1986),andweproposethe
existenceofamotivationalorientationthatactsasabe-
havioral catalyst and relates valence to approach and
avoidance (Cacioppo et al., 1993). To bridge temporal
gapsbetweenadecisionanditsbehavioralimplementa-
tion, we integrated a mechanism of intending
(Gollwitzer,1999).Inaddition,weproposethatthede-
privationofbasicneedsinfluencesspontaneousevalua-
tion and preactivates behavioral schemata relevant for
the satisfaction of the deprived needs.
Takentogether,thevalueofthismodelisnotthatitis
newineachofitscomponents.Rather,weseeitsmerits
initsattemptstointegrateelementsfromexistingtheo-
riesandtodescribehowtheyinteractatdifferentstages
ofprocessing.Mostimportant,wetrytotiementalpro-
cessestosocialbehaviorinanontrivialway;thatis,we
do not assume that behavior follows inevitably from a
decision and therefore does not deserve attention be-
yond its cognitive precursors. Instead, we construe so-
cial behavior as the result of several determinants that
may operate in accord or conflict with each other.
Basic Properties and Functions
For reasons of clarity, the proposed model is de-
scribed in 10 theses (see Figure 1 for an overview). As
mentioned before, several components are shared by
existing dual-process models. The descriptions of
those components are somewhat briefer than of those
we believe to be unique to this model.
Thesis 1: Basic assumption. Social behavior is
theeffectoftheoperationoftwodistinctsystems
of information processing: a reflective system
and an impulsive system. The systems can be
specified by different principles of representa-
tion and information processing.
Inthereflectivesystem,behavioriselicitedasacon-
sequenceofadecisionprocess.Specifically,knowledge
about the value and the probability of potential conse-
quencesisweighedandintegratedtoreachapreference
for one behavioral option. If a decision is made, the re-
flective system activates appropriate behavioral sche-
mata through a self-terminating mechanism of intend-
ing. In contrast, the impulsive system activates
behavioral schemata through spreading activation,
which may originate from perceptual input or from re-
flective processes. As described in James’ (1890)
ideo-motorprinciple(seealsoLotze,1852),abehavior
maybeelicitedwithouttheperson’sintentionorgoal.In
addition, the activation of behavioral schemata may be
moderatedbymotivationalorientationsordeprivation.
222
STRACK AND DEUTSCH
Figure 1. Overview of the reflective–impulsive model. Note that reflective and impulsive processes are represented by solid or broken
lines, respectively.Thesis 2: Parallel operation. Both systems oper-
ate in parallel. However, there is an asymmetry
such that the impulsive system is always en-
gaged in processing (by itself or parallel to oper-
ations of the reflective system) whereas the re-
flective system may be disengaged.
This model assumes that information entering the
perceptualgateswillalwaysbeprocessedintheimpul-
sive system. However, the impact of that information
depends to a great extent on the preactivation of those
structures in the impulsive system in which the infor-
mation is represented. Depending on its intensity and
the attention it receives, a stimulus may also enter the
reflective system. In that case, impulsive and reflective
processing occurs in parallel, and are assumed to inter-
act at various stages of processing.
Thesis 3: Capacity. The reflective system re-
quires a high amount of cognitive capacity.
Therefore, distraction as well as extremely high
or low levels of arousal will interfere with its op-
eration. In contrast, the impulsive system re-
quires little cognitive capacity and may control
behavior under suboptimal conditions. As a con-
sequence, processes of the reflective system are
disturbedmoreeasilythanthoseoftheimpulsive
system.
Oneofthegreatestadvantagesoftheimpulsivesys-
temisthatitisfast,requiresnoorlittlecognitiveeffort,
and has a low threshold for processing incoming infor-
mation, whereas the opposite holds for reflective oper-
ations. The reflective–impulsive model shares this as-
sumption with almost every dual-process model, and
relevant evidence is reviewed elsewhere (see, e.g.,
Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Smith & DeCoster, 2000).
However,weemphasizetheroleofarousalforaproper
functioning reflective system. Resembling the
Yerkes–Dodson Law (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), we
propose that the reflective system operates most effi-
ciently at intermediate levels of arousal. On one hand,
high levels of arousal facilitate well-practiced, domi-
nant responses (Hull, 1943; Zajonc, 1965). Recent
findingshavedemonstratedthatarousalalsoaffectsso-
cial judgments and perception, in that it enhances the
influence of stereotypic and evaluative associations
(e.g., Bodenhausen, 1993; Paulhus & Lim, 1994).
Moreimportant,thiseffecthasbeenrecentlyattributed
to a weakening influence of high arousal on controlled
or reflective processes (e.g., Baron, 2000; Lambert et
al., 2003). On the other hand, very low levels of
arousal, as in the state of drowsiness, are associated
with poor reflective processing and poor self-control
(e.g., Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996).
Representation, Storage, and
Processing of Information
Thesis 4: Relations between elements. Elements
in the two systems are connected by different
types of relations. In the reflective system, ele-
ments are connected through semantic relations
to which a truth value is assigned. In the impul-
sive system, the relations are associative links
between elements and are formed according to
the principles of contiguity and similarity.
Theworldaswellasinnerstatesoftheorganismare
representedindifferentwaysinthetwosystems.Inthe
impulsive system, information is represented in pat-
terns of activation in an associative store. In contrast,
the reflective system is capable of forming proposi-
tional representations by connecting one or more ele-
ments through the instantiation of relational schemata
to which a truth value is attached. Of course, represen-
tations in both systems are ultimately implemented
within a neuronal network; the difference between
simple associations and propositional representations
therefore refers to the computational level of cognitive
modeling (Marr, 1982).1
Associative Links and Structures in
the impulsive system
Inthismodel,theimpulsivesystemisconceivedofas
a simple associative network. In accordance with most
otherassociative-networkmodels(seeSmith,1998),we
assume that the links between elements have different
strengths that are stable and change only gradually
through learning. If an element is activated, activation
spreadstootherelementsinproportiontothestrengthof
the link. The activation of elements in the network can
vary rapidly. The accessibility of a content will be in-
creasedbythefrequencyandrecencyofprioractivation.
In this way, an element acquires an activation potential
(Higgins, 1996) that reduces the amount of additional
activationnecessaryforretrievalorfurtherprocessing.
In general, links are created or strengthened if stim-
uli are presented or activated in close temporal or spa-
tial proximity. The resulting links reflect correlations
between aspects of the environment and cognitive, af-
fective, or motor reactions, without representing the
causes of such multimodal correlations. As a conse-
quence, structures emerge in the impulsive system that
bind together frequently co-occurring features and
form associative clusters. In essence, we assume that
theassociativestoreoftheimpulsivesystemworkslike
a simple memory system (see Johnson & Hirst, 1991),
which slowly forms enduring, nonpropositional repre-
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1Marr (1982) distinguished between the computational,
algorithmical, and implementational level of cognitive processes.sentations of the typical properties of the environment
over many learning trials (see J. L. McClelland et al.,
1995;Smith&DeCoster,2000).Theimpulsivesystem
has low flexibility but is fast and needs no attentional
resources.
In addition, associative links can be formed through
reflective operations. This is possible because every
propositional representation in the reflective system
activates corresponding contents in the impulsive sys-
tem. As a result, elements that do not co-occur in real-
ity but are often related to each other in the reflective
systemwillalsobecomeassociativelylinkedintheim-
pulsivesystem(cf.Smith&DeCoster,2000).Thus,se-
mantic concepts will emerge in the impulsive system
through frequent propositional categorizations. It is
importanttonotethatthelinksintheimpulsivesystem,
different from some other network models (e.g., Col-
lins & Quillian, 1969), are not assumed to have any se-
mantic meaning by themselves. Therefore, the only re-
lationbetweentwoormoreelementsisthatofamutual
activation.
Forexample,ifweseeanelderlyperson,perceptual
featuressuchashaircolororbodyposturemayactivate
specific elements in the impulsive system (see Figure
2).Becausesuchelementshavepreviouslybeenpaired
with other features that are correlated with advanced
age, a whole cluster of elderly features will be acti-
vated.Asaconsequence,contentsoftheelderlystereo-
type will be more readily accessible and may guide
subsequent processing. For example, the concept of
slowness may become activated in the impulsive sys-
tem and reflect our direct or indirect experiences with
elderly people.
Although the connections between elements in the
impulsive system do not carry a truth value and do not
reflect declarative knowledge about elderly people be-
ing slow, the associative link between elderly and slow
may bias perception and influence behavior if it is acti-
vated.Moreover,itispossiblethatmotorprogramsthat
have been executed frequently in connection with el-
derly people in the past may again be activated. Re-
search on the connection between perception and be-
havior bolsters the idea that semantic concepts can be
directly connected to motor programs (e.g., Bargh,
Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001).
Recentfindingsontheinterplayofgesturesandlexical
access indicates that this connection is bidirectional
(e.g., Krauss, Chen, & Gottesman, 2000). Associative
clusters in the impulsive system can be hierarchically
structuredandcanthereforedifferinabstractness.Asa
consequence, clusters may resemble either concrete
perceptual concepts or abstract semantic concepts or
schemata.
Processesintheimpulsivesystemmaybeaccompa-
niedbyanexperientialstateofawareness;thatis,with-
out necessarily knowing its origin, people may experi-
ence a feeling with its distinct phenomenal quality. For
example, a person may have a visual perception of
lightness or darkness, a pleasant or unpleasant feeling,
or the experience of pain or familiarity without know-
ing the concepts or categories of light, pleasantness,
pain, or familiarity. Thus, the impulsive system can be
understood as a system of experiential primacy, in
whichaffectiveandnonaffectivefeelingsaregenerated
quickly and without syllogistic processes of inference
(see also Zajonc, 1980).
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Figure 2. Activation of a hypothetical elderly cluster in the impulsive system. The perception of gray hair leads to a higher accessibility
of associated contents and may facilitate associated behavior.The Generation of Knowledge
Through Propositional
Categorizations and Syllogistic
Inferences in the Reflective System
Theimpulsivesystemcanbethoughtofaslong-term
memory, whereas the reflective system has the proper-
ties of a temporary storage in that the amount of infor-
mationthatcanberepresentedatanygiventimeislim-
ited,andtherepresentationwillfadeifitisnotrehearsed
(Baddeley, 1986). The reflective system generates de-
clarative knowledge by assigning perceptual input to a
semantic category. Unlike simple associative links and
structures, knowledge in the reflective system consists
ofoneormoreelementstowhicharelationalschemais
applied.Mostimportant,atruthvalueisassignedtothat
relation.Asaconsequence,thissystemrepresentsstates
oftheworldortheorganisminapropositionalformat.In
thisendeavor,thereflectivesystemisdrivenbytheprin-
ciple of consistency as it strives to avoid or remedy in-
consistencies between its elements (Gawronski &
Strack, in press). An important feature of representa-
tionsinthereflectivesystemisthattheycanbeflexibly
generatedandchanged.Thus,thereflectivesystemcan
solveamultitudeoftasks,suchasreasoning,planning,
ormentalsimulation.However,itisslowerthantheim-
pulsive system and requires attentional resources.
Howaresuchrepresentationsgenerated?Weassume
that the elements of the proposition—that is, one or
moreconceptsandtherelationthatisappliedtothem—
are retrieved from the impulsive system. The reflective
systemgeneratessemanticorepisodicknowledgebyas-
signingatruthvaluetotheconceptandtherelation.Take
again the perception of an elderly person. The perceiv-
able features have spread activation to the elderly
conceptintheimpulsivesystem.Togenerateaproposi-
tionalcategorization,therelationalschemaofcategory
membership (is a) will be retrieved from the impulsive
systemandcombinedwiththelabelelderlyandtherep-
resentationoftheperceptualinput,inthiscasethevisual
representation of the person. Thus, the propositional
representationthisisanelderlypersonisgenerated(for
a detailed computational account on how relations and
theirargumentsareboundtogethertocomposeproposi-
tions, see Hummel & Holyoak, 2003; see Figure 3).
The number of relations that can be applied to these
contents is nearly infinite. Beside simple logical rela-
tions,suchasisa,isnot,orimplies,therearealsomore
complexandabstractrelations,suchascausality.Inad-
dition, there are many social relations such as friend,
enemy,spouse,orpartner.Ofcourse,newrelationscan
develop as a person’s knowledge expands.
Once knowledge has been generated, syllogistic2
rules are applied to draw inferences that go beyond the
information given (Bruner, 1973). For example, a per-
son may wonder how wise an elderly person is. Cate-
gorical knowledge about the elderly may be derived
from the categorization of a given person as elderly.
The quality wise may then be inferred based on this
categorization. Note again the fundamental difference
to the mere activation of the concept, which facilitates
the inference but does not generate knowledge about
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Figure3. Schematicrepresentationofapropositionalcategorization.Theconceptselderlyandperson,aswellastherelationisa,arere-
trieved from the impulsive system and transformed into a proposition.
2Thetermsyllogisticismeanttorefertoalltypesofrulesthatare
usedforthetransferoftruthfromthepremisestotheconclusion.There
are no implications about the validity of such syllogistic inferences.elderly people being wise. This becomes particularly
apparent in attributional thinking such that the charac-
terization of a particular behavior may spontaneously
activate categories that correspond with personality
traits (Uleman, 1999). However, these categories may
eventuallynotbeusedtocategorizethepersonbecause
the context implies alternative causes of the same be-
havior (e.g., Trope, 1986).
Operations of the reflective system are accompa-
nied by a noetic state of awareness, which consists of
knowledge that something is or is not the case.3 A
noetic state of awareness may be accompanied by an
experientialstateofawareness,whichconsistsofapar-
ticular feeling. For example, the process of trying to
answer an almanac question may be accompanied by a
feeling of knowing (Koriat, 1993).
The Role of Accessibility
The assignment of a relation to elements is strongly
influenced by the accessibility of a category (Higgins,
Rholes, & Jones, 1977). For example, the belief that a
particular person is slow depends on the ease with
which the concept slow comes to mind, which, in turn,
depends on the associative strength between the per-
ceptual input and the concept, that is, on the recency
and the frequency of their joint activation. Of course,
more elaborate inferential strategies that are the basis
of further transformational processing may also be ap-
plied to generate propositional knowledge (i.e., causal
attribution or hypothesis testing).
Because the reflective system uses contents from
the impulsive system, reflective operations will alter
the accessibility of these contents. As a consequence,
subsequent operations in the reflective system will be
influenced by their predecessors. An example of this
influence comes from recent work on the psychologi-
cal mechanisms underlying the so-called anchoring
bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), which refers to the
assimilation of an absolute judgment toward the stan-
dard of a preceding comparative judgment. In a series
of studies, Mussweiler and Strack (see Strack &
Mussweiler, 1997; for a review, see Mussweiler &
Strack, 1999) demonstrated that this bias results from
the use of information that has been selectively acti-
vated during the comparative judgment task preceding
the absolute judgment.
Contents of Representations and
Noetic Decisions
The content of propositional representations can
take many different forms. It may be objects from the
outside world but also experiences that come “from
within” (Bless & Forgas, 2000). In particular, feelings
of different qualities may enter into the reflective sys-
tem if they are propositionally categorized and contex-
tually qualified (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983). A good
example of how feelings that emerge from impulsive
processing can enter reflective processes and even de-
termine choice comes from a study by Bechara,
Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio (1997). In this experi-
ment,participantshadtochoosecardsfromfourdecks,
two of which offered high gains at the risk of an occa-
sional high loss, while the other decks offered lower
gains but with a smaller risk of a loss. Overall, the less
risky deck led to a higher payoff.
When participants were asked to choose from the
four decks, they reported having a feeling which of the
decks were good and bad long before they could name
the payoff matrix of the game. This impulsive reaction
to the playing situation was also mirrored by changes
in skin conductance before participants chose a risky
card, and participants frequently based their choice on
thesefeelings.Anotherinformationalbasisforthegen-
eration of knowledge about others and about the self is
observed behavior. As described by attribution and
self-perceptiontheory(Bem,1967;Kelley,1967),peo-
ple may infer internal states (such as attitudes) from
their own behavior or that of others, and from the con-
text in which it occurs.
It is important to note that noetic decisions can be
made not only about what is the case but also about
what is good or bad, because the syllogistic rules also
apply to evaluative judgments, such as attitudes (see
Schwarz & Bohner, 2001); that is, a person may infer
that something is good or bad based on premises with
evaluative content. To arrive at an evaluative decision,
it is neither necessary nor sufficient that congruent af-
fect is elicited or that the person has an affective expe-
rience. This also relates to the distinction between in-
stant utility and the utility judgments that concern the
past or the future. In particular, Kahneman and collab-
orators(forareviewseeKahneman,1999)showedthat
evaluations of past situations may drastically differ
from what was actually experienced. In retrospect, in-
dividuals seem to rely primarily on the frequency and
the extremity of negative or positive peaks in experi-
enced utility, thereby neglecting the duration of
hedonic experience (but see Schreiber & Kahneman,
2000). Judged or remembered utility refers to a noetic
judgment,whereasexperiencedutilityaccruesfroman
impulsive reaction to hedonically relevant situations.
To be sure, such experiences may accompany the
reflective processing of evaluative (and factual) infor-
mationandfacilitateorinhibitreflectiveprocesses.For
example, a recent set of experiments (Greene,
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001) found
that incongruent affect may interfere with evaluative
judgments. Specifically, research participants had to
judge whether it was justifiable to sacrifice one human
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3The term noetic was introduced to experimental psychology by
Tulving (1985), who differentiated between anoetic, noetic, and
autonoetic kinds of consciousness.life to save five. The scenarios were constructed such
thatmoreorlessnegativeaffectwaselicitedbyconsid-
ering the sacrifice. This was checked by fMRI record-
ings of the brain during decision making. It was found
that under the high negative affect condition, more
timewasrequiredtomakeincompatibledecisions(i.e.,
justifyingthesacrifice)thancompatibledecisions(i.e.,
not justifying the sacrifice). When no or less negative
affect was elicited by the decision task, the response
time did not differ as a function of the outcome of the
decision. In congruence with a recent model of moral
judgment (Haidt, 2001), this finding suggests that peo-
ple may use their affect as a basis of such a judgment,
and that the affect may be in conflict with consider-
ations based solely on value and expectancy.
Finally, reflective operations may instigate or mod-
erate affect. Although in some cases merely perceiving
a specific situation is sufficient to activate affect in the
impulsive system (Le Doux, 1995; Zajonc, 1980), in
other circumstances considerable reasoning is neces-
sary to infer the affective relevance of a situation (Laz-
arus, 1984). In this case, the reflective–impulsive
model assumes that reflection activates affect-specific
contents in the impulsive system that then lead to the
experientialstate.However,knowingthatsomethingis
good (or bad) does not necessarily imply a positive (or
negative) feeling. In fact, the insight that a specific ac-
tion might be good can be accompanied by a bad feel-
ing, for example the upcoming appointment with one’s
dentist. On the other hand, positive feelings toward an
actionmaybeaccompaniedbyanegativeevaluationof
what one may be about to do (i.e., temptation).
Representing What Is Not the Case:
Negations and the Future
As is outlined later, the assumption of different rep-
resentational principles in the reflective and impulsive
system has various implications for current topics in
social and cognitive psychology. However, it also af-
fects capabilities that are fundamental to our thinking
and acting. Specifically, the two representational prin-
ciples contribute to a deeper understanding of how we
comprehend that something is not the case (i.e., how
we negate), and how we think about the future.
Negation. Negating—that is, reversing the truth
value of a proposition—is not only a widespread tool
of thinking (e.g., Wason & Jones, 1963) but also a con-
venient means of everyday communication (e.g., Mac-
Donald & Just, 1989). Because negations are proposi-
tional statements (Horn, 1989; Mall, 1975), boundary
conditions for their successful computation can be de-
rived from the reflective–impulsive model. Most im-
portant, Thesis 4 implies that the cognitive procedure
of negating can only be executed in the reflective sys-
tem. Consequently, only if there is sufficient process-
ing time, intention, and cognitive capacity to extract
the meaning of a negation (e.g., no money) will the re-
flective system be engaged and the task successfully
completed. However, if one of these conditions is not
met, the negation may be processed only in the impul-
sive system. In this case, the negated concept (e.g.,
money) and the negating qualifier (e.g., no or not) will
become activated in the impulsive system, however
they will not be applied to the concept. Consequently,
the immediate effects of processing this information
will be identical to those of processing the same infor-
mation in an affirmed format or even without a quali-
fier attached to it.
Wearecertainlynotthefirsttoproposethatprocess-
ing negations is a resource dependent process. A great
number of studies demonstrates that negations slow
down cognition (Wason, 1959) and are prone to error
(Fiedler,Armbruster,Nickel,Walther,&Asbeck,1996;
Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975; Wegner, Coulton, &
Wenzlaff, 1985). Gilbert’s (1991) sequential model of
negatingdescribeshownegationsmayberepresentedin
memory.Inparticular,themodelsuggeststhatallinfor-
mationinmemoryistrueaslongasitisnot“tagged”as
false.Thistaggingprocessisassumedtoconsumecog-
nitive resources. Empirical evidence consistent with
this assumption comes from a wide array of research.
For instance, Gilbert, Krull, and Malone (1990) asked
participants to learn a fictitious vocabulary by reading
translations(e.g.,“awaihasisafish”).Inaddition,par-
ticipantswereimmediatelytoldthatthetranslationwas
eithertrueorfalse;insometrials,participantsweredis-
tractedasthisinformationwasconveyed.Inthosecases,
false translations were later more often remembered as
being true than true translations were remembered as
being false. In other words: If participants were dis-
tracted, negated information had similar effects as af-
firmedinformation.Thisphenomenonwasreplicatedin
otherexperimentsusingawiderangeofmaterials(e.g.,
Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 1993).
Because these studies typically assessed later judg-
ments or recollections, the results may be due to either
the actual encoding of negations or the later recall of
the information. In a series of experiments, Deutsch,
Gawronski, and Strack (2003) used priming measures
to assess more directly the actual processing of nega-
tions. In these experiments, the effects of evaluative
primingusingaffirmedversusnegatedwordsasprimes
were compared to evaluative judgments of the same
stimuli, which were elicited under conditions that are
favorable for reflective processing. The results demon-
strated that under the priming conditions, effects of af-
firmed and negated stimuli were identical, whereas the
evaluative judgments were strongly affected by the ne-
gations. This implies that the inefficiency of a negation
cannot be reduced to characteristics of memory.
Inaddition,astudybyWegner,Ansfield,andPilloff
(1998)showedthatthisdissociationappliesnotonlyto
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ior.Inthatexperiment,participantswereaskedtoholda
pendulum and try to prevent it from swinging. Not sur-
prising,theywerebetteratholdingthependulumstillif
theywerenotdistractedbyasecondarytask.Inasecond
condition, however, the researchers specifically asked
participants to prevent the pendulum from swinging
along the x axis that was marked on a piece of paper.
Mostsurprising,inthedistractionconditionthependu-
lumswungmorealongthexaxiswhenparticipantswere
explicitly instructed to prevent this from happening
comparedtowhentheyweregivennosuchinstructions.
If it is true that a depletion of cognitive resources in-
creases the likelihood that the impulsive system will
controlbehavior,theinstructionnottoperformacertain
behaviormayhavestrengthenedthelinktoabehavioral
schema that produces the undesired behavior.
Although under specific conditions, the reflec-
tive–impulsive model generates similar predictions as
Gilbert’s (1991) sequential model of negation, the two
models are not identical. Whereas Gilbert’s model fo-
cuses on the representation of negations in memory,
the reflective–impulsive model accounts for memory
and retrieval, as well as for the use of retrieved nega-
tions in judgmental tasks. Specifically, we assume that
during the encoding of a negation, a link between the
negated concept and the negating qualifier will be es-
tablished in the impulsive system. Moreover, we pro-
pose that the establishment of such a link in memory
and its use in judgments are two distinct processes. In
contrast, it is implied in Gilbert’s (1991) model that
when a false tag has been added to a piece of informa-
tion, it will be always correctly recognized as being
false. From the reflective–impulsive model it follows
that for participants who are low on cognitive re-
sources when they use a piece of information that had
been associated with a negating qualifier the effects of
negated information will be similar to those of af-
firmed information, despite the fact that the link to the
negation is available in memory. In addition, the fre-
quentrehearsalofanegationmaystronglyincreasethe
accessibility of the negated concept, as well as the ne-
gation itself. As a consequence, a feeling of familiarity
may arise when thinking of the negated concept; at the
same time, the label false may pop into one’s mind.
This may cause ambiguity, as the experiential cue di-
rectly opposes what is implied by the retrieved quali-
fier. Finally, the reflective–impulsive model predicts
that links between concepts and negating qualifiers
may develop either through reflective elaboration or
through frequent coactivation, which is independent of
reflection. Note again that a false tag is not sufficient
for the use of a negation in the course of social judg-
ments. These predictions from the reflective–impul-
sive model have yet to be tested.
In sum, the reflective–impulsive model can account
for known phenomena in the realm of negations and
generate new predictions that are open to empirical
testing. The main advantage of the reflective–impul-
sive model is that these predictions follow directly
from its general principles.
Representing the future. The second important
consequence relates to the ability to represent the fu-
ture. Because it is more independent from immediate
perceptual input, only the reflective system can explic-
itly generate a time perspective. Specifically, events
that are expected to occur in the future may be catego-
rized as such. This provides an important means of un-
derstanding courses of action and developments over
time. More important perhaps, it allows for the devel-
opment of strategies to pursue goals that are remote in
time. While the impulsive system is driven by immedi-
ate perceptual input, the reflective system is able to ab-
stract from the immediate input and bridge temporal
gaps. This allows individuals to resist immediate re-
wards and strive for more valuable future outcomes.
Empirical evidence supporting this notion comes
from a recent series of experiments by Deutsch and
Strack (2002). In particular, they established learning
conditions under which people were led to emit impul-
sive reactions that were opposed to their reflective
knowledge. Participants where asked to open red and
blue“doorstoaphotogallery”onthecomputerscreen.
Depending on the color of the door, their actions had
different consequences at different points in time. In
one condition, a particular color was immediately fol-
lowed by a photo of an extremely negative valence
fromLang’scollection(InternationalAffectivePicture
System, IAPS; Center for the Study of Emotion and
Attention, 1995), which was presented for 800 ms.
Four sec later, an extremely positive picture appeared
for another 4 sec. In the other condition, the valence of
the two photos was reversed.
Askedwhichphotogallerytheywouldprefer,people
morefrequentlychosethecontingencyconsistingofthe
immediatebutshortexposureoftheunpleasantandthe
delayedbutmuchlongerexposureofthepleasantphoto.
However, the delayed utility should not determine par-
ticipants’reaction if a response has to be emitted under
conditionsthatpreventthereflectivesystemfromoper-
ating. This was the case when participants were in-
structed to open the doors under the conditions of the
stop paradigm (Logan, Schachar, & Tannock, 1997).
Thisprocedurehasbeenusedasabehavioralmeasureof
impulse strength, which is inferred from the ease with
which a response can be deliberately inhibited. As pre-
dicted by the reflective–impulsive model, impulse
strength was determined by the valence of the stimulus
that was immediately associated with the color of the
door;thatis,iftheshortbutimmediatevalencewasposi-
tive,participantswerelessabletoinhibittheelicitedre-
sponsethanifitwasnegative.Inotherwords,thestimuli
acquired“hot”features(seeMetcalfe&Mischel,1999)
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pulses and conflicted with the “cool” knowledge about
reward contingencies that vary over time.
Behavioral Control
A crucial component of the reflective–impulsive
modelisitsassumptionthatthereflectiveandimpulsive
systems elicit behavior through different processes.
However, the execution of impulsively or reflectively
elicitedbehaviorsiscarriedoutbybehavioralschemata
that are part of the impulsive system. We elaborate this
assumptionbyfirstdiscussingthedevelopmentandop-
erationofbehavioralschemataintheimpulsivesystem.
Then,wedescribehowbehavioralschematacanbeacti-
vated through impulsive and reflective processes.
Final Common Pathway to Behavior
Thesis 5: Execution of behavior. There exists a
final common pathway to overt behavior in the
impulsive system that may be activated by input
from the reflective and the impulsive system.
This pathway consists of behavioral schemata of
varying abstractness. If the schema is activated
above a certain threshold, the behavior will be
executed.
Inthismodel,elementsintheimpulsivesystemcon-
sist of sensory, conceptual, affective, and motor repre-
sentations that can be interconnected (see section on
representationandprocessing).Typically,thefollowing
threeelementsconstituteabehavioralsequence:thesit-
uational condition, the behavior proper, and the conse-
quencesofthebehavior.Themodelassumesthatsimilar
learningprinciplesholdforalltypesofrepresentations.
Thus, associative clusters will emerge in the impulsive
system that bind together frequently co-occurring mo-
tor representations with their conditions and their con-
sequences.Thesesensory-motorclustersarecalledbe-
havioral schemata, and similar to other contents of the
impulsive system, they are subject to spreading activa-
tionanddifferintheiractivationpotential.Inaddition,if
onepartofabehavioralschemaisactivated,theactiva-
tionwillspreadtotheremainingelementsofthecluster.
Behavioralschemataandtheirlinkstoothercontentsin
the impulsive system can be understood as habits (see
Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Ouelette & Wood, 1998).
In concordance with Norman and Shallice (1986),
we assume that impulsive and reflective processes can
lead to the activation of behavioral schemata, however
thetwosystemsdifferinhowtheyactivateabehavioral
schema. This is described in the following paragraph.
An important assumption is that more than one behav-
ioral schemata can receive activation at a time. How-
ever, activation must exceed a given threshold to result
in overt behavior.
Conflicts may arise if behavioral schemata are acti-
vatedthatareincompatibleandinhibitoneanother.For
example, through mechanisms of the impulsive sys-
tem, the sight of food may activate an eating schema
while the reflective system is executing a decision to
stop eating. The resolution of the conflict depends on
the strength of the activation for each schema. If the
schemata are activated by the different systems, the
conditions that influence their operation determine
which schema will prevail. For example, the reflective
systemwillbemorelikelytocontrolthebehaviorifthe
necessary cognitive capacity is available. Conversely,
the impulsive system will be more likely to have the
upperhandunderastrongdeprivationofbasicneedsor
underamotivationalorientationthatfacilitatestheexe-
cution of the behavior. These possibilities will be dis-
cussed in a later section.
Precursors of Behavior
Thesis 6: Precursors of behavior. The systems
use different operations to elicit behavior. In the
reflectivesystem,behavioristheconsequenceof
a decision that is guided by the assessment of a
futurestateintermsofitsvalueandtheprobabil-
ityofattainingitthroughthisbehavior.Intheim-
pulsive system, a behavior is elicited through the
spread of activation to behavioral schemata.
Impulsive precursors of behavior. As behav-
ioral schemata are part of the impulsive system, they
can be easily activated by impulsive processes. In par-
ticular, perceptual input may activate elements in the
impulsive system that are associated with behavioral
schemata or even a part of them. For example, seeing a
cupwillactivateadrinkingschema.Inaddition,imagi-
native input as well as reflectively activated content of
the impulsive system may elicit associated behavioral
schemata. Thus, thinking about a cup is assumed to ac-
tivate a drinking schema.
Note that the impulsive precursors of behavior do
not imply knowledge about valence and expectancy.
Althoughnotintheformofsimplereflexes,perception
islinkedtobehaviorinadirectfashion,asdescribedby
the ideo-motor principle (James, 1890). James as-
sumedthat“everyrepresentationofamovementawak-
ens in some degree the actual movement which is its
object”(p.396).Thisisconsistentwiththeassumption
that in the impulsive system, conceptual content and
behavioral schemata are bidirectionally linked. This
holds for either conceptual representations of anteced-
ents or consequences of a behavior, as well as for the
behavior itself. Research supporting the idea of a link
between conceptual and motor contents is reviewed
elsewhere (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001)
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behavior is the result of reasoning that leads to a noetic
decision about the feasibility and desirability of a par-
ticular action (cf. Ajzen, 1991; Bandura, 1977). If the
execution of the behavior is deemed to be feasible and
its outcome positive, a behavioral decision will relate
the self to the behavioral outcome.
Althoughthisreflectiveprocedureseemstoguaran-
teeareasonedactionasitsbehavioralconsequence,the
previous thesis points to influences from the impulsive
system that are outside the deliberator’s attention. In
particular, the differential accessibility of information
about behavioral options or about relevant aspects of
the alternatives may direct reflective processing; that
is,althoughaproceduremayberationalwithrespectto
the normative model, it is influenced by contents
whose accessibility is determined by factors unrelated
to rational considerations (e.g., Gregory, Cialdini, &
Carpenter, 1982).
However, a behavioral decision may not immedi-
ately elicit a goal-directed behavior. Instead, activation
may spread to several behavioral schemata and con-
cepts in the impulsive system. There may be at least
two reasons why the appropriate behavior may not be
executed immediately. First, other behavioral sche-
mata that are incompatible with the behavioral deci-
sion may be activated. This issue will be addressed in
the following. Second, the behavioral decision may re-
fertoalaterpointintime.Thisissueisaddressedinthe
section on intending.
Synergistic and Antagonistic
Interplay of Decisions and Impulses
Thus far, we have described how impulsive and re-
flective processes may jointly activate behavioral
schema that control overt behavior. The effect on be-
havior, however, depends on the compatibility of the
twoforces.Specifically,ifthereflectivesystemandthe
impulsive system contribute to an activation of the
sameschema,thebehaviorisfacilitated.Moreover,the
cognitive capacity required to control the execution
will be decreased and the execution of the behavior
maybeaccompaniedbyafeelingoffluency,whichhas
a positive hedonic quality (Winkielman & Cacioppo,
2001).Togetherwiththepositiveevaluationoftheout-
come, the cooperation of the two systems has enor-
mous motivational implications.
However, the two systems may also compete if they
activate incompatible schemata or if the reflective sys-
tem inhibits the execution of a behavior that is impul-
sivelyactivated.Suchantagonisticactivationmaybeac-
companied by a feeling of conflict and temptation. For
example,apersonwhoisonadietmaybetemptedtoeat
a second dessert (see Figure 4); that is, the sight of the
dessert impulsively activates behavioral schemata that
aredirectedtowardconsumption.Atthesametime,the
reflectivesystemhasgeneratedabehavioraldecisionto
refrain from eating it. To win the contest, the reflective
system can apply knowledge about the mechanisms of
theimpulsivesystem.Mosteffectively,itmaydivertat-
tention from the tempting stimulus.
Finally, it is important to note that although both
systems may contribute to the execution of behavior,
theimpulsivesystemcanassumeprimarycontrolifthe
operating conditions (see Thesis 3) for the reflective
system are not fulfilled. As a result, behavior is less
likely to be determined by the assessed valence and the
probability of future consequences than by the imme-
diate associations and the resulting hedonic quality.
Intending
Thesis7:Intending.Inthereflectivesystem,abe-
havioraldecisionislinkedtobehavioralschemata
by the process of intending. Intending monitors
theimpulsivesystemforinformationthatenables
the behavioral implementation of the decision.
The mechanism of intending is terminated if the
behaviorisexecutedorifthegoalofthepreceding
behavioral decision is already fulfilled.
Animportantfactorwemusttakeintoconsideration
is that frequently an action cannot be executed at the
timethebehavioraldecisionismade.Infact,theexecu-
tion of many decisions depends on specific conditions
that are not yet fulfilled. Thus, there may be a gap be-
tweenabehavioraldecisionandanaction.Iftheexecu-
tionofareflectivelychosenbehaviordependsontheac-
tivation of behavioral schemata, constant activation
would be necessary to bridge possible temporal gaps.
However,suchapermanentrehearsalofbehavioralpro-
gramswouldabsorbagreatamountofcognitivecapac-
ityandincreasetheriskthatthebehaviorisexecutedbe-
fore the appropriate conditions are fulfilled. This,
however,doesnotseemtobeadaptiveandmayevenbe
detrimentalwithrespecttotheproperpursuitofthegoal.
Therefore,wesuggestaprocessofintendingasithas
beendiscussedinmoderntheoriesofhumanmotivation
(e.g., Gollwitzer, 1999). We assume that the temporal
gapbetweenabehavioraldecisionandtheexecutionof
aninstrumentalbehaviorisbridgedbyaprocessthatau-
tomaticallyreactivatesthebehavioraldecisionandthus
activatesbehavioralschematathatareappropriateinthe
situation. Moreover, we assume that the process of in-
tendingisself-terminating;thatis,whenthegoalofthe
decision has been reached, the process is turned off.
We predict that intending also plays a role if a goal
is blocked. Because of the hierarchical organization of
goals, people may check the instrumentality of the ob-
structed goal vis-à-vis a superordinate objective and
chooseadifferentmeanstothesameend.Althoughthe
appropriate evidence is still lacking, we expect that
other than through trial and error, the circumvention of
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ternative means–ends relationships and initiate a new
operation of intending.
Motivation
So far, we have described the reflective system as a
highlyflexiblesystemwhenitcomestoaction,whereas
theimpulsivesystemappearstoberelativelyrigid.Spe-
cifically, changing evaluations in the reflective system
may result in new decisions and their concomitant be-
havioral consequences. In contrast, the impulsive sys-
tem seems to be driven by the perceptual input as it is
connected to behavioral schemata. Changes of these
linksareassumedtodevelopslowlyfollowingthelawof
effect, the law of readiness, and the law of practice
(Thorndike, 1911).
However, there are some ways in which the impul-
sive system can also react more flexibly, taking exter-
nal and internal conditions into account. For external
conditions, we propose that the impulsive system can
alternate between two distinct motivational orienta-
tions that guide the processing of information and the
activation of behavior. For internal conditions, we pro-
pose a specific way by which homoeostatic
dysregulations may influence impulsive processing.
Bothmotivationalaspectsareoutlinedinmoredetailin
the following sections.
Motivational Orientation
Thesis 8: Motivational orientation: The impul-
sivesystemcanbeorientedtowardapproachand
avoidance. This motivational orientation may be
elicited by
• the processing of positive or negative information,
• the perception of approach or avoidance,
• the experience of positive or negative affect,
• theexecutionofapproachoravoidancebehaviors.
In the impulsive system, processing of information
andtheexecutionofbehavioraremediatedbytwomoti-
vational orientations (Cacioppo et al., 1993). In accor-
dancewithothertheorists(e.g.,Gray,1982;Lang,1995;
Sutton & Davidson, 1997), we assume that these func-
tionalorientationsservetopreparetheorganismfortwo
fundamentaltypesofreactionstowardtheenvironment:
approachandavoidance.Approachorientationisapre-
paredness to decrease the distance between the person
andanaspectoftheenvironment.Thisincludesphysical
locomotion, instrumental action, consumption, or the
imaginationthereof.Avoidanceorientationcanbecon-
ceptualized as a preparedness to increase the distance
between the person and the environment. This can be
achievedbyeithermovingawayfromatarget(flight)or
bycausingthetargettoberemoved(fight).Thespecific
typeofresponsewithinbothmotivationalorientationsis
determined by other influences.
Because evidence for the existence of approach and
avoidance systems is extensively reviewed elsewhere
(Gray,1982;Lang,1995),wefocushereontherelation-
shipbetweenaffect,behavior,andinformationprocess-
ing within the two motivational orientations. The fol-
lowing thesis is grounded in the idea that processing of
positive information and the experience of positive af-
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Figure 4. Impulsive and reflective activation of competing behavioral schemata. While the perception of a dessert directly activates an
approach tendency, the noetic decision to lose weight leads to the behavioral decision to go for a walk instead of eating the dessert.fect are most important for the regulation of approach
behavior, whereas the processing of negative informa-
tion and the experience of negative effect are most im-
portant for the regulation of avoidance behavior.
Thesis9:Compatibility.Theprocessingofinfor-
mation, the experience of affect, and the execu-
tionofbehaviorarefacilitatediftheyarecompati-
ble with the prevailing motivational orientation.
The following propositions can be derived directly
from Thesis 9: If the impulsive system is oriented to-
ward approach, it facilitates the processing of positive
information, the experience of positive affect, and the
executionofapproachbehavior.Inanavoidancemode,
itfacilitatestheprocessingofnegativeinformation,the
experience of negative affect, and the execution of
avoidance behavior. Moreover, Thesis 9 implies the
principle of bidirectionality, that is, a reverse causal in-
fluence (cf. Neumann, Förster, & Strack, 2003). Spe-
cifically, a motivational orientation may be elicited by
the valence of the processed information, the valence
of affect, or the orientation of a behavior (approach vs.
avoidance).
In the reflective system, a behavior may become the
basisforinferencesaboutitsunderlyingattitude(Bem,
1967). This, however, requires that the behavior is
propositionally categorized. That is to say, only if the
behavior is related to a category (e.g., forgetful) can it
enter into syllogistic inferences. In contrast, process-
ing in the impulsive system and the principle of
bidirectionality allow a behavior to influence process-
ing without being propositionally categorized; that is,
people are influenced by what they are doing even if
the meaning of an action is not recognized.
In the following discussion, we first review evi-
dence backing the idea that behavior may have a direct
effect on the processing of information that occurs in
the impulsive system and is therefore not mediated by
syllogistic inferences. At the same time, this evidence
servesassupportforThesis9,whichreferstocompati-
bility as a basic principle of the impulsive system.
Then we focus on the reversed direction of influence
and review studies that illustrate the impact of
evaluative information on behavior. The principles of
motivational orientation are represented in Figure 5.
The Compatibility Principle I: The
Direct Impact of Behavior on
Mental Processes
Facial feedback. Self-perception theory (Bem,
1967)isamongseveralapplicationsthathavebeenhar-
nessedtoexplainaphenomenoninthedomainofemo-
tional expression. Specifically, it has long been argued
(e.g.,Darwin,1872/1965)thatfacial(andotherbodily)
expressions serve to not only communicate feelings to
others and thereby regulate social exchanges but also
to increase or diminish the intensity of an affective ex-
perience. Applied to the face, Darwin’s facial-feed-
back hypothesis has been studied from a self-percep-
tion perspective. Most prominently, Laird (e.g., 1974)
found that experimental participants who had been
asked to adopt a smiling expression gave a more posi-
tive judgment about themselves (e.g., their own
well-being) and about affective stimuli (e.g., cartoons)
thathadbeenpresentedtothem.Accordingtoself-per-
ception theory, participants inferred their affective
state from their facial expression. Such an inference,
however, requires that the behavior be interpreted as
the expression of a particular affective state; that is, a
person can only infer that she must be happy (or
amused) if she knows that she is smiling.
From the perspective of the reflective–impulsive
model, this is not the only way in which an overt be-
haviormayinfluencementalprocesses.Theinferences
described by self-perception theory operate according
to the principles of the reflective system; the impulsive
system, in contrast, allows for different mechanisms.
Specifically, it follows from Thesis 9 (compatibility)
that behavior may directly influence information pro-
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Figure 5. Principles of motivational orientation.cessing.Indetail,thebehavioralschematathatactivate
an emotional facial expression are assumed to be
linked with evaluatively compatible thought contents
and perhaps with affective experiences, and this facili-
tates the processing of the affective information.
This process may be mediated either through the
hedonic quality of the emotion or through the ap-
proach-versus-avoidance function of the behavior. In
the case of the induced smile, we assume that the im-
pulsive system facilitates the processing of positive in-
formation. As a consequence, cartoons will be rated as
funnier and people will feel more amused.
However, to demonstrate that a facial expression
may influence an emotional experience even if indi-
viduals do not draw an inference from the behavior, it
was necessary to prevent people from recognizing the
emotional meaning of their facial action. This was
achieved by embedding the contraction of the facial
muscle (in this case, the zygomaticus) in a task unre-
lated to an emotional expression. Specifically, under
the pretext of investigating how people who must do
so write or paint with their mouth, Strack, Martin,
and Stepper (1988) asked experimental participants to
hold a pen either between their teeth or between their
puckered lips while rating several cartoons inter-
spersed among other tasks. Thus, the teeth-holding
position activated the zygomaticus muscle, which is
used in smiling; the cover story prevented partici-
pants from interpreting their facial action as “a
smile.” Nevertheless, people assigned to this experi-
mental condition reported feeling more amused and
rated the cartoons as funnier than people who held
the pen with their puckered lips.
These findings (see also, Bodenhausen, Kramer, &
Suesser, 1994; Erber, 1991; Martin, Harlow, & Strack,
1992; Zajonc, Murphy, & Inglehart, 1989) show that
the effect of facial feedback does not depend on infer-
encesfromtheperceivedemotionalmeaningofafacial
expression. Rather, facial feedback may also affect
mental processes in a more direct fashion, which can
be explained easily and parsimoniously by the mecha-
nisms that the reflective–impulsive model ascribes to
the impulsive system.
Postural feedback. Extending the same logic to
another medium of expressing emotions, Stepper and
Strack (1993) induced experimental participants to
adopt an upright or slumped posture under the pretext
of studying different working conditions. Based on
previous studies (Riskind, 1984), Stepper and Strack
expected that people would experience the emotion of
pride more intensely when adopting an upright body
position. Again, those earlier studies did not rule out
that people drew an inference from the quality of their
postureaboutthequalityoftheiremotionalstate.Inthe
StepperandStrackstudy,however,theposturewasdis-
guised as an ergonomic investigation. Still, partici-
pants who were induced to believe they had scored
above average in a preceding task and were asked to
adopt an upright body posture while they received this
feedback reported feeling prouder than participants
who received the same information while adopting a
slumped posture. This result corroborates and extends
the previous facial-feedback findings (Strack et al.,
1988). It shows, in a different expressive dimension,
thattheimpactofpostureonmentalprocessesdoesnot
hinge on inferences that are based on the perceived
meaning of the bodily action.
Head movements. Although these studies clearly
demonstrate the phenomenon, they are not explicit about
the exact mechanisms that afford such a direct influence
of a behavior on mental processes. Subsequent studies
were more informative. In particular, a series of experi-
ments in which we (Förster & Strack, 1996) explored the
effect of head movements on the recognition of words
shedslightonsomeunderlyingmechanisms.Participants
wereaskedtonodorshaketheirheadwhilereadingposi-
tive and negative words. To disguise the
communicational meaning of the head movements as an
act of agreement or disagreement, we had participants
“test headphones to be used while dancing” (Wells &
Petty, 1980). Specifically, participants were required to
perform either horizontal or vertical head movements
while the words were played on a cassette recorder.
As expected, we found that the head movements af-
fected performance in a surprise recognition task. In
particular, participants who had been induced to nod
werebetteratrecognizingpositivewords,whilepartic-
ipants who had been induced to shake their head were
better at recognizing negative words. Moreover, this
proved not to be a response bias that affects the thresh-
old for words of a particular valence. Rather, the data
showed that when the head movement was compatible
with the valence of the word, people were better at dis-
criminatingwhetherthewordhadbeenpresented.This
suggests that the behavior influenced the processing of
the words at the time of the encoding.
This encoding hypothesis was tested more directly
in a second experiment, using a dual-task paradigm.
More specifically, while participants were explicitly
instructed to learn the words while nodding or shak-
ing their head, they were also required to perform a
manual dexterity task. If head movement facilitates
(or inhibits) the encoding of information, more (or
less) cognitive capacity will be left to perform the
secondary task. As a consequence, we predicted a
better manual dexterity performance if the learning of
positive words was accompanied by nodding, and the
learning of negative words by shaking one’s head.
Conversely, the outcome of the dexterity task should
be poorer if positive words are learned while shaking
one’s head, and negative words while nodding. The
results supported these predictions. Moreover, the in-
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inhibition occurred as a function of valence-motor
compatibility or incompatibility.
These findings provide evidence for motor influ-
ences on mental processing when the behavior has no
immediateevaluativeimplications.However,theseim-
plicationsaremediatedbyamotivationalsubsystemof
which the behavior is a part. In most cultures, nodding
is a nonverbal signal for agreement and shaking one’s
head for disagreement; these head movements are
therefore linked to an orientation toward approach or
avoidance that influences the way behavior is impul-
sively regulated. Tuning the impulsive system to an
orientation of approach facilitates the processing of
positive information and inhibits the processing of
negative information. Conversely, tuning the system
toward avoidance facilitates the processing of negative
information and inhibits the processing of positive in-
formation. Thus, head movements and the valence of
wordsareeithercompatibleorincompatibleandfacili-
tate or inhibit the processing of information.
Approach and avoidance through isometric
muscle contractions. Similar effects were obtained
for a motor action that was previously found to influ-
ence positive and negative affect. In particular,
Cacioppo and his collaborators (e.g., Cacioppo et al.,
1993) discovered that pressing the palm of one’s hand
from the bottom against the surface of a table, thereby
activating the flexor muscle of the arm, led to positive
attitudinal judgments, while pressing from the top
against a table platform, thereby activating the
extensor muscle, led to negative attitudinal judgments.
Cacioppoetal.(1993)arguedthatthroughpreviousas-
sociations, flexor and extensor actions elicit a motiva-
tional orientation of approach versus avoidance.
The reflective–impulsive model integrates and ex-
tends Cacioppo et al.’s (1993) notion of a motivational
orientation that can be activated by any behavior com-
patible with approach or avoidance. It should therefore
be possible to apply the described influence of head
movementstoreproductionmemory(Förster&Strack,
1996) using the flexor-extensor paradigm. This was in
factachievedbyFörsterandStrack(1997)fortherepro-
ductionoffamousnames;thatis,contractingtheflexor
muscle facilitated the recall of positively connotated
names, whereas contracting the extensor muscle im-
proved the recall of negatively connotated names.
The postulated principle of compatibility and
bidirectionality found additional support in a study by
Neumann and Strack (2000), who used a different de-
pendent variable. In particular, participants who were
presented words on a computer screen had to decide if
these words were positive or negative in valence. As
predicted by the reflective–impulsive model, we found
that positive words were categorized more rapidly
when participants had been induced to flex their arm,
whereasnegativewordswerecategorizedmorerapidly
whenparticipantshadtocontracttheextensormuscle.
Finally, Seibt and Neumann (2002) applied the
flexor/tensor procedure to the assessment of cartoons
and found that participants reported feeling more
amused if the flexor muscle was contracted than if the
tensorornomusclewasactivated.Moreover,Seibtand
Neumann found that reported social anxiety (elicited
by the expectation of having to speak in front of a large
audience) was increased if participants had been in-
duced to contract the tensor muscle.
Direct activation of a motivational orientation.
Inthereportedstudies,thelinkbetweenabehaviorand
the processing of evaluative information was assumed
to be strengthened through the prevailing motivational
orientation. To repeat, the impulsive system may be
oriented toward approach or avoidance (cf. also Lang,
1995), and this orientation may be triggered by the va-
lence of the processed information, by the experience
of compatible affect, and by the perception of move-
ments that imply approach or avoidance. An activated
motivational orientation results in the lowering of
thresholds for the processing of compatible informa-
tion (i.e., positive information for the approach and
negative information for the avoidance orientation),
and for the elicitation of compatible behaviors that
stand in a functional relationship with the orientation.
Onewayofactivatingamotivationalorientationisto
put people in a situation in which the distance between
thepersonandanobjectappearstobeincreasingorde-
creasing;thatis,ifthedistanceisdecreasing,theimpul-
sive system should be oriented toward approach; if the
distance is increasing, the impulsive system should be
orientedtowardavoidance.Asaresult,theprocessingof
compatible information should be facilitated.
In a very direct test of this notion, Neumann and
Strack (2000) gave participants an evaluative decision
task in which the valence of positive and negative
words presented on a computer screen had to be cate-
gorized. More important, these words were presented
inthecenterofcirclesthatwereeitherincreasingorde-
creasing in size. As documented in a manipulation
check, the changing size of the circles created the ap-
pearance that the words were moving either toward the
person or away from the person, although the actual
size of the letters remained constant. As predicted by
the reflective–impulsive model, this apparent change
in the distance between the target and the person influ-
enced the evaluative decision such that the valence of
positive words was categorized faster if the word ap-
peared to be moving toward the viewer, whereas the
valence of negative words was categorized faster if the
words appeared to be moving away.
To verify that this finding does not depend on the
evaluative nature of the task, we used the same para-
digm for a lexical decision task in which the stimulus
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words but also neutral words and nonwords. Partici-
pants were asked to decide whether a letter string on
the screen was a word. Again, the response latencies
wereaspredicted:Lexicaldecisionsforpositivewords
were faster if the letter strings appeared to be moving
toward the person, while lexical decisions for negative
words were faster if the letter strings appeared to be
moving away. This suggests that the predicted facilita-
tion effect is not a function of the evaluative nature of
thetaskbutdependssolelyonthevalenceofthestimuli
(see also, Chen & Bargh, 1999).
The Compatibility Principle II: The
Impact of Evaluative Information
on the Execution of Behavior
On several occasions, we have emphasized
bidirectionality as a signature characteristic of the im-
pulsive system. This implies that a behavior may acti-
vate a motivational orientation, which then lowers the
threshold for the processing of compatible informa-
tion.Howeverthisalsoimplies,conversely,thattheva-
lence of information may exert a facilitating influence
on compatible behaviors that is mediated by the moti-
vational orientation. Concretely, it implies that the be-
haviors that served as independent variables in the ex-
periments described in the preceding paragraphs
should also operate as dependent variables. The avail-
able evidence supports this implication.
Facial action. As described in a previous sec-
tion, unobtrusively manipulated facial expressions
were found to influence evaluative judgments (Strack
et al., 1988). Conversely, we expected that facial ac-
tions would be facilitated if compatible information is
processed. This prediction was confirmed in a still un-
published set of experiments by Neumann and Hess
(2001), in which participants had to respond by con-
tracting their facial muscles. In particular, under the
pretextofstudyingwhetherresponsestopsychological
tasks emitted by body parts that are closer to the brain
differed from responses produced by more remote
body parts (such as the hand), participants had to con-
tract the corrugator or the zygomaticus muscle. Sur-
face electrodes recorded the EMG activity of both
muscles while participants assessed the valence of
words presented on a computer screen. As predicted,
the positivity of words was indicated faster with the
help of the zygomaticus (smiling) muscle, while the
negativity of words was assessed faster if participants
were using the corrugator (frowning) muscle. As in
previous studies, it was important to find out whether
theeffectdependedontheevaluativenatureofthetask,
or whether the evaluative nature of the stimulus influ-
enced the processing even for tasks with no evaluative
implications (see Neumann & Strack, 2000).
To that end, Neumann and Hess (2001) conducted a
second experiment in which participants had to merely
indicate when a stimulus appeared on a computer
screen. The stimuli were positive or negative words,
andthereactionshadtobeprovidedbyeithercontract-
ing the corrugator or the zygomaticus. Again, the com-
patibilitybetweenthevalenceofthestimuliandthena-
ture of the motor action determined the response
latencies. Participants indicated the appearance of pos-
itive words faster when using the zygomaticus muscle,
and the appearance of negative words faster when us-
ing the corrugator muscle.
These findings provide clear evidence for the
bidirectionality postulated by the reflective–impulsive
model.Inparticular,itwasshownthatfacialactionpro-
videsnotonlyfeedback(Laird,1974)byinfluencingthe
processingofevaluativeinformationbutalsothatitsex-
ecution is controlled by the valence of information.
Approach and avoidance through isotonic move-
ments. In previous studies that were based on a pro-
cedure by Cacioppo and associates (e.g., Cacioppo et
al., 1993), we were able to show that the processing of
positiveversusnegativeinformationwasfacilitatedde-
pending on whether the flexor or the extensor muscle
was contracted (Förster & Strack, 1997, 1998;
Neumann & Strack, 2000). This effect was expected
because the contractions are associated with move-
ments of approach and avoidance. The postulate of
bidirectionality predicts the opposite causal direction.
In particular, movements that are directed toward the
person should be facilitated if positive information is
processed, whereas movements away from the person
should be easier if the information is negative.
First evidence for this influence came from a study
by Solarz (1960), who presented cards with words that
were either positive or negative. Depending on the
words, participants had to either push these cards away
from themselves (avoidance) or pull them toward
themselves (approach). Solarz found that participants
were faster if the valence of the word and the move-
mentwerecompatible;thatis,fasterreactionswereob-
served if positive words had to be pulled toward the
person and negative words had to be pushed away.
This finding was replicated by Chen and Bargh
(1999), who had participants evaluate words on a com-
puterscreenasgoodorbadbyeitherpushingorpulling
a lever. In line with Solarz’ (1960) findings, lower re-
sponse latencies were obtained if the valence of posi-
tive words had to be indicated by pulling the lever or
thevalenceofnegativewordsbypushingthelever.Ina
second study, Chen and Bargh (1999) showed that this
compatibility effect did not depend on the evaluative
nature of the task. Rather, it was also obtained if the
task was simply to indicate whether a word (that was
either positive or negative) appeared on the screen.
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ments of one’s head influence the encoding of negative
or positive information (Förster & Strack, 1996). The
reverse, however, is also the case. Wells and Petty
(1980) found that people nodded their head more often
if they agreed with the content of an attitudinal mes-
sages they heard through headphones. Similarly,
Förster and Strack (1996) observed that when partici-
pants had to nod while encoding the words, positive
words increased the rate of nodding. Conversely, if
people had to shake their head, negative words in-
creased the rate of shaking.
Affect as a determinant of motivational orienta-
tion. The distinction between two motivational ori-
entations is closely related to a model proposed by
Lang and his associates (for a review, see Lang,
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990), who postulated appetitive
and aversive motivational systems that facilitate be-
havioral responses. Based on biological and
neuropsychological evidence, these researchers as-
sume that “associations, representations, and action
programs that are linked to the engaged motivational
system have a higher probability of success” (Lang,
1995, p. 377). Moreover, these motivational systems
are activated by an organism’s emotional or affective
state. An extensive program of research with animals
and humans found that startle responses were in-
creased when negative affect had been elicited. This
was particularly the case for the emotion of fear. At the
same time, the startle response was found to be inhib-
ited if the organism was in the state of positive affect.
These findings support the reflective–impulsive
model in its assumption of a motivational orientation
thatlinksmentalandbehavioralprocesses.Atthesame
time, the dynamics of the impulsive system and the
role of the motivational orientation go beyond the
mechanisms identified by Lang and his associates
(e.g., Lang, 1995). For example, the reflective–impul-
sive model treats behavior as a dependent and an inde-
pendent variable. As previously described, a particular
behavior may elicit a motivational orientation, which
may then facilitate the processing of compatible infor-
mation. In the reflective–impulsive model, the motiva-
tional orientation functions by selectively lowering the
thresholdfortheprocessingofevaluativelycompatible
information and for the execution of functionally com-
patible behaviors. At the same time, the motivational
systems theory provides important links to underlying
biological substrates, particularly the role of the
amygdala.
Homoeostatic Dysregulation
Thesis 10: Homoeostatic Dysregulation. Depri-
vation of basic needs will lead to an activation of
those behavioral schemata that in the past fre-
quently led to satisfaction of those needs.
Motivational orientations only moderate the execu-
tionofbehaviorandtheprocessingofinformationbased
onvalence.Althoughthisistrueforawiderangeofbe-
haviors,somesituationsmaycallforamorespecificdis-
positiontoact.Inparticular,ifbasicneedsarenotsatis-
fied, specific behaviors are necessary to remedy this
stateofdeficiency.Toaccountfortheinfluenceofbasic
needswithinthereflective–impulsivemodel,weinvoke
a mechanism resembling the notions proposed in early
drivetheory(Hull,1943).Inparticular,weproposethat
whenever a state of deprivation is successfully abol-
ished, behaviors and situational circumstances that led
tosatisfyingtheneedbecomestronglylinkedtotheex-
perience of this deprivation (cf. Dickinson & Balleine,
2002).Consequently,ifthesameneedisdeprivedagain,
the behavioral schemata and conceptual contents that
werepreviouslyrelatedtothesatisfactionwillagainbe
activated and produce a behavioral preparedness and a
perceptual readiness for the processing of relevant in-
formationintheenvironment(Bruner,1957).Forexam-
ple, the deprivation of food will facilitate behavioral
schemata of food intake and spread activation to con-
ceptualrepresentationsoffood.Asaresult,stimulithat
arerelatedtofoodshouldberecognizedmoreeasilyun-
der conditions of food deprivation.
ThiswasfoundinanexperimentconductedbyWispe
andDrambarean(1953),whoaskedparticipantstorec-
ognize words that were presented very briefly on the
computer screen. Some of their participants had not
eatenfor10or24hours,whereasothershadhadasnack
just prior to the experiment. Moreover, the words were
either food related or not. As expected, hungry partici-
pants were faster at detecting food-related words than
neutral words. However, no such difference was ob-
servedinparticipantswhowerenothungry.Similarre-
sultswererecentlyobtainedbyAarts,Dijksterhuis,and
De Vries (2001) for thirst and drinking-related words.
Support for our notion that people’s attention toward
stimulithatarecapableofreducingthedeprivationisin-
creased by the behavioral schemata is provided by a
studybyLavyandvandenHout(1993).Basedonfast-
ingparticipants’ratingsoffoodvalenceandurgetoeat,
LavyandvandenHoutconcludedthatattentionalbiasin
aStrooptaskwasmorelikelytocomefromanincreased
urgetoactthanfromdeprivedpeople’semotionalexpe-
rience. The increased accessibility of need-relevant
concepts may also guide the interpretation of ambigu-
ous stimuli. For example, D. C. McClelland and
Atkinson(1948)demonstratedthathungryparticipants
were more likely than satiated participants to identify
ambiguous stimuli as food-related objects.
Homoeostatic dysregulations may also modulate
evaluative responses. As Lewin (1935) noted, the va-
lence of an object “usually derives from the fact that
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78). Existing evidence shows that need-related objects
are experienced to be more positive under deprivation
(e.g.,Drobesetal.,2001;Lavy&vandenHout,1993).
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that need-irrele-
vant objects are devaluated (Brendl, Markman, &
Messner, 2003). That such shifts of valence occur im-
pulsively was recently demonstrated by Seibt, Häfner,
andDeutsch(2003)whofoundintwoexperimentsthat
evaluative associations related to food as well as spon-
taneous orientations toward approach versus avoid-
ance depended on food deprivation.
It is important to note that the link between depriva-
tion and the facilitation of behavioral schemata and the
activationofconceptualcontentsisbelievedtodevelop
onlyforneedsthatareimmediatelyexperienced.Other
dysregulations (such as that of blood pressure) are not
experienced. Thus, the described behavioral and con-
ceptual mechanisms will not be elicited.
Affect and Emotion
Affectandemotionareunderstoodasproductsofthe
reflective and the impulsive system. Following Rus-
sell’s (2003) theory of emotion, our model implies that
theimpulsivesystemgeneratesasimplystructuredstate
ofcoreaffectthat,byreflectiveprocesses,canbetrans-
formedinmoreelaboratefeelingsandemotions.Inpar-
ticular, we assume that a person’s core affect is a state
that can be experienced on the dimensions of hedonic
qualityandarousal.Thus,apersonmayfeelgoodorfeel
badinawaythatisaccompaniedbyhighorlowactiva-
tion.Becausetheoriginofthisstateisnotpartoftheex-
perience, situationally and chronically accessible con-
tents may be reflectively assigned as causes.
As a consequence, a noetic awareness emerges
along with the experienced affect. For example, people
may feel good (or bad) about themselves. At the same
time,theymayengageinbehaviorsthataredirectedby
the valence of the affective quality and fueled by the
state of activation. Based on emotional schemata, the
particular configuration of experience and knowledge
may then be categorized as a particular emotion. Then,
a person may, for example, feel proud about a particu-
lar achievement (e.g., Neumann, Seibt, & Strack,
2001) or disappointed at a friend’s betrayal.
Thus,thereflective–impulsivemodeldoesnotclaim
that specific emotions produce specific behaviors.
Rather,itmaintainsthatbehavioralschemataareimpul-
sivelyinfluencedbyhabitstrength,motivationalorien-
tation and homeostatic dysregulation. In addition, re-
flectiveconsiderationsmayenterintotheequation.For
example, we do not assume that fighting is a necessary
behavioral consequence of anger whereas fleeing is a
necessary result of fear. Instead, and in agreement with
Russell’s (2003) model, we propose that the evaluative
qualityoftheinformationorientsthesystemtowardin-
creasing the distance (i.e., avoidance). Whether this is
accomplished by moving away from the target (i.e.,
flight)orbycausingthetargettoberemoved(i.e.,fight)
dependsondeterminantsinthesituationandintheper-
son(e.g.,Keltner,Grunfeld,&Anderson,2003),orthe
levelofactivation.Theexperiencedemotionsoffearor
angerarethecategoriesthatareusedtorepresenttheen-
tire emotional episode in the reflective system.
From this conceptualization it follows that affect
mayinfluencebehaviorinatleasttwoways.First,core
affect possesses a motivational orientation toward ap-
proach and avoidance that facilitates concomitant be-
haviors.Second,affectiveexperiencesmaybeproposi-
tionallycategorizedandbecomethebasisofsyllogistic
inferences that may lead to noetic and behavioral deci-
sions.Bothpossibilitiesarediscussedinthisarticle.For
a more detailed integration of affect and emotion into
dual-systemnotions,seeSmithandNeumann(inpress).
Automaticity
During the past 15 years, automaticity has become
an increasingly important topic in social psychology
(e.g., Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). Even
such complex social-cognitive processes as goal acti-
vation (e.g., Bargh & Barndollar, 1996), trait infer-
ences(e.g.,Gilbert,1989),ortheimitationofsocialbe-
havior (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Bargh, & Miedema, 2000)
have been shown to operate outside consciousness,
without intention, to be hard to control as well as
highlyefficient(cf.Bargh,1996).Itisawidelyheldas-
sumption that automaticity of cognitive procedures is
achieved through frequent execution (e.g., Anderson,
1981). As Bargh (1997) put it: “Any skill, be it percep-
tual, motor, or cognitive, requires less and less con-
scious attention the more frequently and consistently it
is engaged” (p. 28).
How can automaticity be understood from the van-
tagepointofthereflective–impulsivemodel?Ofcourse,
itistheimpulsivesystemtowhichthecentralcriteriaof
automaticity(seeBargh,1997)apply.Particularlyitsin-
dependence from intention and its high efficiency fol-
low from its architecture as an associative network. In
contrast, the reflective system is assumed to depend
heavily on cognitive resources and to generate inten-
tionsthroughbehavioraldecisions.However,according
tothereflective–impulsivemodel,thequalityoftheim-
pulsive mechanisms differs from that of reflective pro-
cesses,whichiswhyadirecttranspositionofreflective
procedures to the impulsive system is not possible.
Thisraisesthequestionofhowcontrolledprocesses
canbecomemoreautomatic?Thereflective–impulsive
model implies several mechanisms that play a role (cf.
Smith, 1994; Smith, Branscombe, & Borman, 1988).
The first and most simple mechanism is that contents
from the associative store of the impulsive system are
used and thus activated during reflective processing. If
237
REFLECTIVE AND IMPULSIVE DETERMINANTSinformationistransformedthroughasyllogisticproce-
dure (e.g., to infer the valence of a negated word), the
input to the procedure (e.g., the negated word) as well
as its output (e.g., the resultant valence) will be acti-
vated in the impulsive system. If this is repeated fre-
quently, the joint activation of input and output will es-
tablish an associative link between the two contents.
Thus, the results of previous syllogistic procedures are
stored in memory and eventually can be retrieved in an
automatic fashion (cf. Logan, 1988).
Thismemory-basedmechanismpredictsonlyanar-
rowtransferofautomaticresponsestonewinstancesor
situations. In particular, only the reaction to those or
similar (cf. Palmeri, 1997) instances that were prac-
ticed can be elicited in an automatic fashion. However,
the reflective–impulsive model can also account for
more general effects of practice (see also, Anderson,
1993). First, the operational principles of the reflec-
tive–impulsive model imply that the frequent execu-
tion of reflective procedures makes the representation
of these procedures more accessible for further use.
Second,representationsofproceduresmaybecomeas-
sociated with situations in which they were frequently
carried out. Finally, syllogistic procedures may be-
come associated with other procedures if they are fre-
quently carried out in temporal proximity. Conse-
quently, complex syllogistic operations may become
more efficient through practice, because the more spe-
cific procedures they consist of can be quickly re-
trieved from memory.
These assumptions set limits for automatic process-
ingunderspecifiablecircumstances.Anexampleisthe
well-practiced cognitive operation of negating. Evi-
dence (Deutsch et al., 2003) suggests that through the
frequent execution of this operation, semantic links
will be created that facilitate further processing. For
example, the term no way has acquired its own mean-
ing whereas the term no hay needs further reflective
processing to be understood, independent of the fre-
quency with which the former negation is used. It is
therefore the particular content that profits from fre-
quent practice, but not the generalized application of
therule.Inthismodel,thefrequentexecutionofreflec-
tive mechanisms may form associations and allows the
impulsive system to “take over.” However, this does
not mean that the reflective procedure of negating will
be performed automatically; rather, it will be substi-
tuted by a different mechanism that fulfills the criteria
of automaticity.
Althoughtheideathatthesamepsychologicalproce-
durecanbetransposedfromoneoperationalmodetoan-
other has a venerable history in psychology and goes
backtoHelmholtz’s(1867)notionofunconsciousinfer-
ences,wesecondLiebermanetal.(2002)inthattheidea
ofautomaticprocessesasmerelyfasterandquieterver-
sionsofcontrolledprocesses“istheoreticallyparsimo-
nious, intuitively compelling, and wrong” (p. 205).
Application to Phenomena in Social
Psychology
In the remainder of this article, we discuss the im-
plications of the reflective–impulsive model (see Fig-
ure 6 for the full model) for various aspects of social
psychology and illuminate its potential for explaining
different phenomena of social behavior. Special em-
phasis is given to predictions where this model will go
beyond or differ from existing dual-process models.
Implicitness and Explicitness in
Attitudes, Prejudice, and Stereotyping
Inthepastdecade,researchinsocialpsychologyhas
increasingly focused on so-called implicit phenomena
(e.g.,Farnham,Greenwald,&Banaji,1999).Inparticu-
lar,centralconceptssuchasstereotypes,prejudice,atti-
tudes,orgoalswereassumedtooperatenotonlyascon-
tents of consciousness but also outside of conscious
awareness (e.g., Banaji, 2001; Blair, 2001). To study
such implicit phenomena, new methods of research
have been developed (e.g., Maass, Castelli, & Arcuri,
2000),suchastheimplicitassociationtest(Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), evaluative priming
(Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986), or af-
fective variants of the Stroop and Simon task (e.g., De
Houwer,Crombez,&Baeyens,2001).Thesemeasures
haveincommonthattheydonotrelyonconsciouseval-
uationsoftheattitudeobjectitself,therebycircumvent-
ingcorrectionalprocessesbecauseofsocialdesirability
orotherreasons.Instead,theytapintomechanismsthat
are automatically instigated by the attitude object.
There is no doubt that the reflective–impulsive
model bears a family resemblance to explicit–implicit
models in that both notions hold that different mecha-
nisms may mediate between valence and behavior.
However, there are several issues on which the reflec-
tive–impulsive model takes a divergent position. First,
we suggest that the two systems operate in parallel and
interact with one another. In contrast, most ex-
plicit–implicit models assume a sequential mode of
operation (see Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Second, the
partition of the reflective–impulsive model into two
systemsisnotbasedonthepresenceorabsenceofcon-
scious awareness (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
We refrain from using the phenomenal experience that
mayaccompanymentalprocessesasadistinctivecrite-
rionbecausewedonotknowpreciselyhowconscious-
ness arises from psychological or neural processes. In
particular, consciousness is often seen as an
epiphenomenon rather than a causal force or even an
integral part of cognition (Libet, Gleason, Wright, &
Pearl, 1983; Wegner, 2002). Moreover, categorizing a
process as conscious or unconscious provides little in-
formation about its computational nature. Therefore,
the reflective–impulsive model does not invoke the ex-
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plicit goals, or implicit self-esteem.
Some theorists in the field of implicit social cogni-
tion have begun to elaborate on more unique features
of implicit phenomena. For instance, Wilson et al.
(2000) advanced the thesis that implicit attitudes may
change more slowly than explicit ones and tend to in-
fluence expressive and automatic behaviors. Green-
waldetal.(2002)specifiedimplicitassociativemecha-
nisms that incorporate principles of cognitive balance.
We would like to go one step further and propose to
ground the implicit–explicit distinction primarily on
operational characteristics. In line with other dual-pro-
cess models (e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 2000), we locate
implicit processes in the impulsive system, whereas
explicit processes are thought to take place in the re-
flectivesystem.Specifically,weprefertousetheterms
explicit versus implicit for psychological processes but
not for mental contents. As a consequence, an attitude
isdefinedasabelieffollowingfromanevaluativedeci-
sion that follows from reflection about what is good or
bad. At the same time, we talk about evaluative associ-
ations to describe links between concepts and
evaluativeresponsesintheimpulsivesystem.Inasimi-
lar vein, stereotypic associations are distinguished
from stereotypic beliefs (Devine, 1989).
This conceptualization affects the interpretation of
implicit measures. Despite their popularity, the psy-
chologicalstatusofwhattheyassessisstillunclear(for
a review, see Fazio & Olson, 2003). Some theorists ar-
guethatimplicitmeasuresidentifyimplicitattitudesor
implicit stereotypes (e.g., Wilson et al., 2000); others
prefer to view the measure itself as implicit, but not the
attitude (or whatever other concept; Fazio & Olson,
2003). From the perspective of the reflective–impul-
sive model, explicit and implicit measures are defined
by the cognitive operations that they capture. In this
sense, explicit measures tap into people’s knowledge
or beliefs, implicit measures tap into their associative
structures.
Beyond redefining the implicit versus explicit di-
chotomy, the reflective–impulsive model may help to
understand how behaviors may be influenced by ex-
plicit and implicit mechanisms. Although it has been
proposedthattheimplicitandexplicitphenomenamay
take different routes to behavior (e.g., Dovidio,
Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Wil-
sonetal.,2000),mostmodelsarerelativelymuteonthe
cognitiveormotivationalstructuresunderlyingsuchin-
fluences. The reflective–impulsive model can account
for such influences through its inherent interconnec-
tions between conceptual and behavioral representa-
tions as well as through its motivational orientations.
Automatic Attitude Activation
Many studies (see Fazio, 2001) have demonstrated
thatattitudesmaybeactivatedveryquickly,efficiently,
unintentionally, or even unconsciously on the percep-
tion of the attitude object. In his influential motivation
and opportunity as determinants model (MODE
model), Fazio (1990) specified the circumstances un-
der which attitudes may automatically influence be-
havior. In particular, Fazio assumed that only strongly
associated attitudes will exert automatic influences.
The main process through which attitudes may influ-
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Figure 6. Overview of the complete reflective–impulsive model.ence behavior spontaneously is by influencing the per-
ception of the situation. If motivation and cognitive re-
sources are high, however, more deliberate
considerations and effortful search in memory may
prevail and determine the perception of the situation
and finally the behavior.
Although the mechanisms of the reflective–impul-
sivemodelareconsistentwiththetenetthatmotivation
and opportunity (for thorough processing) are precon-
ditions for reflective choice, the model proposes a
somewhat different mechanism for nondeliberative
processing.Bothmodelsassumethatobjectscanbeas-
sociated with a positive or negative valence. The
MODEmodelsuggeststhattheactivationofsuchposi-
tive and negative associations may tune the perception
of the situation, which then influences behavior in a
spontaneous fashion. Although the reflective–impul-
sive model includes this mechanism as a possibility, it
also affords an alternative option that does not require
the operation of the reflective system. Specifically, the
reflective–impulsive model proposes that a behavior
may be influenced by its facilitation through a motiva-
tional orientation that is activated by the valence of the
processed contents (see Thesis 9). Finally, the impul-
sive system provides for the possibility that perception
is directly linked to behavioral schemata, allowing for
an even more direct path to behavior than the MODE
model (see Thesis 5).
Thus, from the perspective of the reflective–impul-
sive model, the behavioral component of an attitude
hasareflectiveandanimpulsivemeaning:reflectivein
that it refers to a behavioral decision that is derived
fromanevaluation,andimpulsiveinthatitreferstoac-
tion tendencies that are directly associated with the
evaluative features of the attitude object.
Intuitive and Heuristic Judgments
As mentioned earlier, theorizing in social psychol-
ogyhasbeenenrichedbydual-processmodelsthatdis-
tinguish between rule-based and associative process-
ing (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). At the same time, it has
been recognized that judgments may be generated in
ways that differ in the ease with which they can be per-
formed. In particular, it has been argued that judges
may use mental shortcuts to save time and effort. Most
prominent, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) identified a
set of judgmental heuristics that serve this purpose.
Some dual-process theorists (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken,
1993) have combined the two research programs and
proposedthatheuristicandnonheuristicjudgmentsare
generated by qualitatively distinct processes (for an al-
ternative view, see Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999;
Strack, 1999). First, there is a systematic mode in
whichjudgmentsareformedfollowingrationalorlogi-
calprinciplesoftherule-basedtypeofprocessing.Sec-
ond, there is an intuitive or heuristic mode in which
judgmentsaregeneratedinwaysthatarebasedonvari-
ous simplified associative procedures that afford
decisions under suboptimal conditions.
At first glance, the reflective–impulsive model may
seem to mirror this distinction. This, however, is not
the case, because there are no reflective versus impul-
sive ways to social judgments that people can choose
as alternatives. Rather, we assume that judgments and
decisions are exclusively made by the reflective sys-
tem, whereas the impulsive system operates in parallel
(see Thesis 3). How then can the reflective–impulsive
model account for intuitive or heuristic judgments?
The answer rests on a more detailed analysis of
what we mean by judgments that are not generated in a
systematicfashion.Ingeneral,thereseemstobeagree-
ment that they consist of shortcuts to circumvent
effortful and time-consuming systematic processing.
From the perspective of our model, there are three
types of shortcuts driven by noetic, experiential, or be-
havioral processes.
Noetic shortcuts are conceived as simplifying infer-
ences based on characteristics of the target. One exam-
pleisthebeliefthatalong,persuasivemessageismore
valid than a short message (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
Thus, the general principle length implies strength is
used as a premise in an inference (see Kruglanski &
Thompson, 1999) that allows a person to make a deci-
sionwithouttediouslyscrutinizingeachargument.Ina
related fashion, the rule of similarity implies category
membership may simplify propositional categoriza-
tions that would otherwise require complex computa-
tions using base-rate probabilities (see Tversky &
Kahneman, 1982).
At the same time, there are experiential shortcuts,
whichareconceivedofassimplifyinginferencesbased
on subjective experiences. For example, the mental ef-
fort that is experienced while trying to generate a judg-
ment may become the basis for an inference about the
target. The probability of an event’s occurrence
(Tversky&Kahneman,1973)andthefameofaperson
(Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989; see also
Strack & Neumann, 2000) seem to be determined by
the experienced mental effort. Similarly, affective ex-
periences (such as current mood) may become the ba-
sis for inferences about one’s own global well-being
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983) or for judgments about con-
sumer goods (Wänke, Bohner, & Jurkowitsch, 1997).
Noeticandexperientialcomponentsarecombinedin
athirdshortcutthatimmediatelyfollowsfromamecha-
nism described by the reflective–impulsive model: A
judgment may be based on a behavioral tendency or a
motivational orientation that is produced by the impul-
sivesystem.Extendingthelogicofself-perceptionthe-
ory(Bem,1967),thenoeticandexperientialrepresenta-
tion of one’s behavioral tendencies may enter the
reflective system before they are actually carried out.
Thus,apersonnotingthatheorsheisdriventoapproach
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edge and use it for inferences about the target.
According to the model we present, the impulsive
system plays a passive role in heuristic and intuitive
judgments. In particular, its operation may provide an
experiential awareness and the associative contents to
which mental shortcuts are applied. However, the ap-
plication of these simplifying rules of reasoning takes
placeinthereflectivesystem.Thisisindicatedparticu-
larly by the fact that judges may correct for a lack of
representativeness in the noetic or experiential basis of
the judgment. The correctional mechanism in situa-
tions where affect is used as information has been re-
peatedly demonstrated and discussed by Schwarz and
Clore (e.g., 1996; for a more general perspective, see
Strack, 1992; Strack & Hannover, 1996).
Thus, although it may seem tempting to connect
nonsystematic judgments to specialized intuitive or
heuristicprocesses,theexplanationprovidedbythere-
flective–impulsive model is quite different. In particu-
lar,themodelsuggeststhatalthoughjudgmentsandde-
cisionsaremadeinthereflectivesystem,itisimportant
tounderstanditsinteractionswiththeimpulsivesystem.
This is particularly obvious in the case of experiential
shortcutswhereonemustaskunderwhatconditionsand
atwhatpointsinthejudgmentalsequencesubjectiveex-
perience may enter into the reflective system.
Regulatory Focus
One of the most influential theories in recent moti-
vational science is regulatory focus theory (RFT; Hig-
gins, 1997), which predicts how strategies of approach
and avoidance result from positive and negative events
that are experiences or expected. This topic has been
under research for a long time, and RFT is in line with
the conventional view or hedonic principle (e.g., Gray,
1982;Lang,1995)inthatconsideringthepresenceofa
positive valence as an outcome (gain) elicits a type of
approach orientation that is described as promotion fo-
cus,whereasconsideringthepresenceofanegativeva-
lenceasanoutcome(loss)elicitsanavoidanceorienta-
tion or a prevention focus. However, RFT goes beyond
thehedonicprinciplewhenitcomestomotivationalef-
fects of considering nongains and nonlosses as out-
comes.AccordingtoRFT,deliberatingaboutnongains
as possible outcomes of one’s action is connected to a
promotion focus and should therefore elicit an ap-
proach-type orientation, although its overall valence is
negative. Similarly, deliberating about nonlosses as
possible outcomes is assumed to instigate a prevention
focus and therefore avoidance-type behaviors, despite
its overall valence is positive.
Applying the reflective–impulsive model to this
topic leads to a more differentiated prediction. In par-
ticular,differentmotivationalorientationsareassumed
to depend on whether operations are carried out in the
impulsive or in the reflective system. As was outlined
before,webelievethattheimpulsivesystemadheresto
the hedonic principle (i.e., positive stimulation facili-
tates approach, negative stimulation facilitates avoid-
ance),andthatitisincapableofextractingthemeaning
of negations. Consequently, the impulsive system can-
not represent nongains or nonlosses in terms of propo-
sitions, but only as associations. In particular, a person
may experience a situation in which frequent rewards
aredelivered.Forinstance,averytalentedstudentmay
be frequently praised by all teachers. At the same time,
some external cues may signal the omission of reward,
thatisnongain.Forinstance,thestudentmaylearnthat
she is frequently rewarded, except when she is in math
class, because her math teacher does not like her and
praises everyone but her. In this situation, the opera-
tional principles of the impulsive system predict that
the math teacher will become associated with frustra-
tion (cf. Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997) and will
serve as a signal of negative stimulation that is, in turn,
expected to instigate an avoidance orientation. Analo-
gously, signals of nonpunishment are predicted to be-
come associatively linked to positive affect and thus an
approach orientation.
If information about nongains and nonlosses is con-
veyed verbally, however, a different pattern is pre-
dicted to occur. In this case, the valence of the event
must be inferred reflectively from negated statements,
whereas in the case of conditioning, the valence is al-
ready stored in memory. At the same time, because
contents of reflective operations are assumed to be re-
trieved from the impulsive system, the negated con-
cepts will receive activation, thereby instigating a con-
gruent motivational orientation. Take the situation of a
student, hearing the sentence “if you do not succeed at
the test you’ll not get good grades.” Within the impul-
sive system, hearing this sentence is assumed to acti-
vate the concepts success and good, as well as not,
which are of predominantly positive valence. Thus,
perceiving verbal descriptions of potential nongains
will instigate an approach orientation. Similarly, per-
ceiving verbal descriptions of potential nonlosses will
instigate an avoidance orientation.
Insum,thereflective–impulsivemodelpredictsthat
informationaboutnongainsandnonlosseshasopposing
effects depending on whether it is conveyed through
discriminativestimulithathaveacquiredtheirmeaning
through associative learning or in a verbal format con-
tainingnegations.Whereasintheformercase,nongains
are assumed to elicit an avoidance motivation because
theycuefrustrationandhencenegativeaffect,inthelat-
ter case an approach orientation is predicted because
positive concepts will be activated in memory. Up to
now, this prediction has not been tested in an adequate
experimental setting. However, some evidence, sam-
pledacrossexperimentsandspecies,canberegardedas
first evidence for the viability of this prediction.
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RFT, action-outcome expectations were conveyed ver-
bally, whereas in animal research on operant and Pav-
lovian conditioning (see Rescorla & Solomon, 1967),
cues for nonreward and nonpunishment acquired their
meaning through associative learning. It is significant
thathumanandanimalexperimentationdiffersinitsre-
sults.Studieswithhumanparticipantsmatchourpredic-
tions for the case when information is conveyed ver-
bally.Forexample,someparticipantsinoneexperiment
byCroweandHiggins(1997)wereinstructedthatthey
wouldnothavetoperformadislikedtaskiftheydonot
dopoorlyontheexercises(preventionfocus),whileoth-
erswhereinstructedthattheywouldhavetodoadisliked
task if they do not do well on the exercises (promotion
focus).4 In several cognitive tasks, participants in the
prevention focus were found to be more cautious and
slow,andthusmoreaccuratethanparticipantsinapro-
motion focus (e.g., Förster, Higgins, & Idson, 1998;
Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2000; Shah, Higgins, &
Friedman, 1998). In contrast, results from animal stud-
iesmatchourpredictionsforassociativelylearnedcues.
Inoneexperiment(Ray&Stein,1959),ratslearnedthat
ahightonewasassociatedwiththereceivinganelectric
shock,whereasalowtonewasassociatedwiththeomis-
sionofsuchashock.Inasecondpart,theanimalshadthe
opportunity to press a bar for the delivery of milk. This
type of approach behavior was suppressed if the signal
for punishment (the high tone) was presented simulta-
neously.Moreinteresting,thesignalfornonpunishment
(lowtone)facilitatedtheapproachbehaviorabovebase-
line responding. Other research reviewed by Rescorla
andSolomon(1967)aswellasbyKlein(1996)indicates
thatconditionedsignalsfornonrewardfacilitateavoid-
ance behavior and that signals for nonpunishment in-
hibit avoidance behavior.
Insum,thereflective–impulsivemodelaccountsfor
phenomena of regulatory focus as a joint effect of re-
flective and impulsive mechanisms. The dissociation
of the effects of indirect verbal versus direct condi-
tioned activation of nongain and nonloss expectancies
can then be understood as the consequence of different
properties of the impulsive system and the reflective
system. This interpretation, however, relies on results
that were obtained across studies and species. Future
research should generate experimental procedures that
allowtheorthogonalactivationofdirectversusindirect
of expectancies in human participants.
Conclusion
In this article, we have advanced the position that
behavior is determined not only by assessments of
probability and value. This means that social behavior
is not exclusively determined by people’s attitudes.
Rather, it is important to consider impulsive influences
and study their interaction with the components of re-
flective determination. This framework integrates con-
ceptsfrommotivationalscienceintoadual-systemthe-
ory and is able to explain a wide range of phenomena
such as habitual versus intentional behavior, spontane-
ous approach and avoidance behavior, perception-be-
haviorlinks,andeffectsofdeprivation.Beyondthisin-
tegrative attempt, the reflective–impulsive model may
contribute more than the sum of its parts in that phe-
nomena, that are unexplained assumptions in other
models,followlogicallyfromthisframeworkandfrom
its operating characteristics. This includes phenomena
as diverse as the processing of negations, the limits of
automaticsocialcognition,orthemechanismsofregu-
latory focus.
More important, the proposed perspective may help
recover some phenomena that are considered to be the
precursors of social psychology, specifically, the psy-
chology of mass behavior (Le Bon, 1895; see also
Freud, 1921/1922; McDougall, 1920). Despite the in-
sights that have been gained by replacing the mass by
the group, social psychologists are ill at ease when it
comes to explaining social behaviors that are not
guided by people’s attitudes, such as panic behaviors,
vandalism, riots, uprisings, and many facets of aggres-
sionandviolence.UnlikeLeBon,wedonothavetoin-
voke an irrational and emotional group mind that is
susceptible to hypnotic suggestion. Instead, our under-
standing of the mechanism of impulsive actions and of
the conditions under which they occur will provide us
with a more complete picture of social behavior.
Another advantage of the reflective–impulsive
model is that it lends itself to approaches from neuro-
science (see also, Lieberman et al., 2002). Although it
seems difficult to link the reflective system and the im-
pulsive system as a whole to specific brain structures,
this may well be possible for specific psychological
processesdescribedinthemodel.Takeforinstanceim-
pulsively aggressive behavior that is due to reflective
underregulation.Neuroscientistshaveconvincinglyar-
gued that such underregulation correlates with struc-
tural damage to the prefrontal cortex (Raine, Lencz,
Buhrle, LaCasse, & Colletti, 2000). In addition, dam-
ageinthenucleusaccumbensmayberelatedtodeficits
in the impulsive system (Cardinal, Pennicott,
Sugathapala, Robbins, & Everitt, 2001).
The notion that reflectively generated attitudes and
impulsive responses that express evaluations might be
due to the operation of different systems was recently
supportedbyaneuropsychologicalstudyconductedby
Phelps and her colleagues (Phelps et al., 2000). Based
on findings from brain imaging, it would appear that
amygdala activity was correlated with impulsive be-
haviorindicatingprejudiceagainstAfricanAmericans,
while it was not correlated with reflective expressions
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4There were other conditions irrelevant to our discussion.ofracialattitudes.Thissuggeststhattheamygdalamay
becapableofdetectingstimulusvalenceextremelyfast
(Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1998) and before it can be
processed by the reflective system. The distinction be-
tween flexible and fast acquisition of information in
the reflective system and slowly changing representa-
tions in the impulsive system was recently linked to
neocortical and hippocampal structures (J. L.
McClelland et al., 1995). Of course, these few exam-
ples are only a sketch of possible interconnections be-
tween the two lines of research. A more thorough anal-
ysis, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
Another area to which these principles can be ex-
tended is that of behavioral disorders. Until 1964, psy-
chologicalresearchonsocialandabnormalphenomena
was published in the same scientific journals. Since
then, however, normal and abnormal behaviors have
beenseenasdistinctcategoriesandexplainedbydiffer-
ent theoretical models. From the perspective of the re-
flective–impulsive model, the difference between the
twotypesofbehaviorisonlyoneofdegree,notofkind.
What we call “abnormal” can often be described as the
chronic determination of a behavior through only one
operating system. One example is addiction, a psycho-
logicalcategorythatmaynotbeconfinedtotheabuseof
drugs,butmayalsodescribebehaviorsthataredifficult
to control by intention, such as overeating, gambling,
watching TV, or surfing the Internet. As another exam-
ple, phobic behaviors may be understood as being pre-
dominantlycontrolledbytheimpulsivesystem.Theau-
tomatic associations of a stimulus with a fear response
(cf. Bouton, Mineka, & Barlow, 2001) may then be as-
sessedwithimplicitmeasuressuchastheImplicitAsso-
ciation Test (IAT; e.g., Teachman, Gregg, & Woody,
2001).Similarly,depressionmaybeaccompaniedbyan
automatic tendency to negatively evaluate information
thatisrelevantfortheself.ResultsfromtheIATsuggest
thatthisisthecase(Gemar,Segal,Sagrati,&Kennedy,
2001). Another example of application is panic reac-
tions of crowds. Here, arousal is predicted to diminish
reflectiveprocessing.Atthesametime,observingother
persons’ fearful expressions and flight behavior will
fuel own avoidance reactions, particularly fear and
flight and further enhance the arousal.
In conclusion, this conceptualization suggests that
social psychology should recognize the importance of
animpulsivedeterminationofsocialbehaviorandstudy
its mechanisms, particularly its interaction with the re-
flective determinants that are the primary focus of our
theorizing.Inthisendeavor,itmaybenotenoughtodu-
plicate the processes or outcomes of the reflective sys-
tem and propose implicit decisions. Instead, it seems
necessarytostudytheuniquemechanismsthatdrivethe
systemandunderstanditsadaptivevalueinguidingbe-
havior under suboptimal circumstances.
As mentioned at the outset, the notion that humans
are rational beings is only part of the truth. We know
that behavior is not only determined by its anticipated
consequences but also driven by forces outside of ra-
tional control. However, it is not sufficient to focus on
any one of these forces in isolation. To understand
whatpeopledo,itseemsnecessarytostudythedynam-
ics of behavior as the result of interacting influences.
Wehaveproposedthattheyoriginatefrompsychologi-
cal systems that obey different operational principles.
The reflective–impulsive model of social behavior we
have suggested is meant to provide a framework for
this endeavor. Future research will test its merits.
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